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INTRODUCTION
On April 9, 2004, the University of Oregon School of Law and
the Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics1 presented a one-
day symposium entitled, “Malthus, Mendel and Monsanto: Intel-
lectual Property and the Law and Politics of Global Food Sup-
ply.”2  The symposium brought together academics, lawyers,
1 This conference was made possible by a generous research grant from the
Wayne Morse Center for Law and Politics, 2003-2004. Special thanks to Professor
Caroline Forell, Interim Director of the Morse Center, 2003-2004, also to Kim
O’Brien, Administrator of the Morse Center, to law students, Cheri Brooks and
James McCurdy, Morse Center Fellows, 2003-2004, and to Margaret Hallock, Direc-
tor of the Morse Center.
2 Speakers included (in alphabetical order: Professor Keith Aoki, University of
Oregon School of Law; Dr. Susan Bragdon of the International Plant Genetic Re-
source Institute (IPGRI); Professor Stephen Brush, UC-Davis, Department of
Human and Community Development; Professor Ignacio Chapela, Assistant Profes-
sor, UC-Berkeley, Department of Ecology; Professor Maggie Chon, Seattle Univer-
sity School of Law; Professor William Heffernan, University of Missouri, Columbia,
Department of Rural Sociology; Professor Stephen Jones, winter wheat breeder at
Washington State University and former chair of the National Wheat Crop Germ-
plasm Committee; Ms. Kim Leval, Senior Policy Analyst in the Rural Policy Pro-
gram of the Center for Rural Affairs and Executive Director, Consortium for
Sustainable Agricultural Research; Professor Charles McManus, Green Professor of
Law, Washington University School of Law; Professor Malla Pollack, Visiting Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Oregon School of Law; Dr. Henry L. Shands, Director
of the USDA’s National Center for Genetic Resources Preservation; and Professor
Madhavi Sunder, UC-Davis King School of Law.
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scientists, farmers, and food activists to listen to three panels3
and an evening keynote address by Canadian canola farmer
Percy Schmeiser.4
The papers that follow this Introduction were presented at the
conference; they critically assess how changes in intellectual
property laws over the past two decades have affected the global
food supply.  These changes have been occurring on at least three
interrelated fronts: (1) striking levels of concentration in the agri-
cultural seed, fertilizer, transport, and retail sectors; (2) changes
in how agricultural knowledge is produced and disseminated (as
well as how access to seed germplasm is controlled); and (3)
changes in both domestic U.S. and international treaties pertain-
ing to intellectual property laws that are affecting, and are af-
fected by, the prior phenomena.
I
MALTHUS, MENDEL, AND MONSANTO
The title of the conference arose from the present-day inter-
section of trends represented by the three Ms named in the title:
Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto.  Thomas Malthus was a late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century dystopian and dark
economist who foresaw population outstripping food supply
3 The panels were entitled: (1) The Global Food Supply: Concentraion, Erosion,
Traditional Knowledge and Crisis (Brush, McManis, Heffernan, and Chapela); (2)
The Production of Agricultural Knowledge and Access to Seed Germplasm (Brag-
don, Haapala, Jones, and Shands); and (3) Intellectual Property and Beyond (Aoki,
Chon, Leval, and Pollack).  The lunch time keynote speaker was Professor Madhavi
Sunder, who delivered a talk, “The Romance of the Public Domain,” and the eve-
ning keynote, as mentioned in the text, was Canadian canola farmer Percy
Schmeiser who delivered a talk entitled, “David and Goliath: Monsanto v.
Schmeiser.”
4 Schmeiser v. Monsanto Co., 2004 S.C.C. 34 (In this case Monsanto alleged that
Schmeiser, a farmer, had infringed its patent rights by planting, and later harvesting
and selling, genetically modified canola seeds containing genes and cells protected
by Monsanto’s patent claims.  Monsanto’s patents covered only cells and genes that
conferred herbicide resistance to the canola plants and not the plant themselves.
Schmeiser challenged the validity of these patents.  In a split decision, the Canadian
Supreme Court held that whether patent protection for genes and cells extends to
the whole plant was relevant only to an infringement rather than a validity analysis.
Therefore, genes and cells may confer patent rights over the whole plant despite
unpatentability of the whole plant.  The other ruling concerned whether possession
may constitute infringement.  The majority stated that possession only raises a re-
buttable presumption of use, one which Schmeiser failed to rebut in this case.  How-
ever, Monsanto was not entitled to any monetary damages since Schmeiser did not
profit from its invention.).
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growth, thereby justifying cutting back on public support for the
poor in his time.5  From his time to ours, Malthus’s name has
been invoked for a variety of ends, many of them conservative
and reactionary.  Over the past few decades, Malthuisan analysis
has been used by writers such as Paul Ehrlich and Garrett Har-
din to argue against international food programs to fight hunger
in the developing world.6  At the very least, the specter of Mal-
thusian population growth forms a disturbing backdrop to some
of the claims of the life sciences industry that genetic engineering
is necessary to avert a catastrophic food supply deficit.7
5 Thomas Robert Malthus was born near Guildford, Surrey, England on February
13, 1766.  Known almost exclusively for his influence on Charles Darwin, Malthus’s
interests were mainly centered on social conditions and political economy, with his
work on population playing an integral part.  Malthus’s travels through Europe be-
ginning in 1799 supplied much of the evidence he needed to develop his theory on
population growth.  Malthus’s first major original work, initially published anony-
mously, was An Essay on the Principle of Population, as It Affects the Future Im-
provement of Society, With Remarks on the Speculations of Mr. Godwin, M.
Condorcet, and Other Writers (London 1798).  He later published Principles of Polit-
ical Economy Considered With a View to Their Practical Applications (London,
1830). The Travel Diaries of Thomas Robert Malthus  (Cambridge, 1966), edited by
P. James, is a journal of his travels.  He died near Bath, England on December 23,
1834.  For more on Malthus’s life, see AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES,
VOLUME IX, DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY 67-71.
6 Ehrlich adopted a policy based on the concept of “triage” in military medicine
first suggested by William and Paul Paddock.  This concept classifies underdevel-
oped nations as: (1) those that will undergo a transition to self-sufficiency without
food aid, (2) those that will achieve self-sufficiency only with food aid, and (3) those
that are so far behind in the “population-food game” that there is little hope that
food aid will result in later self-sufficiency.  According to this policy, the finite assis-
tance available should only be targeted towards the second group of nations, rather
than those that can either survive without, or not be saved in spite of, such aid. See
PAUL R. EHRLICH, THE POPULATION BOMB 146-47 (1968).  For his part, Hardin
contends that the markedly higher population growth in poor nations makes it un-
sustainable for rich nations to offer food aid in the long-term.  Against this back-
drop, he argues that food aid would only benefit select corporate entities in rich
nations while serving as a disincentive for poor nations to implement policies that
would foster food security.  Because the population growth in poor countries may go
unchecked, resulting in a limitless increase in the need for food aid, Hardin urges the
denial of such aid.  This denial, according to Hardin, would have the positive effect
of checking the rapid population growth in poor nations, thus eventually stabilizing
the proportion of poor to rich populations. See  Garrett Hardin, Life Boat Ethics,
The Case Against Helping the Poor , PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Sept. 1974, at 38-43, 124-
26.
7 Nobel laureate economist, Amartya Sen sees the emphasis on food supply falling
behind global population growth as misplaced owing to the scant evidence to sup-
port such a diagnosis.  Sen contends that, in most areas of the world, the increase in
food supply has been comparable to, or faster than, population growth.  However,
this increased supply has not eliminated starvation.  In fact, some of the more severe
famines have occurred with no significant reduction in food availability per person.
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Gregor Mendel was an early to mid-nineteenth century Augus-
tinian abbot who undertook and published the first work that un-
covered the laws of heredity in pea plants.8  When his work was
published in the mid-nineteenth century, it was largely ignored,
but was rediscovered by agronomists in the United States and
Europe around the turn of the twentieth century.9  The redis-
covery of Mendel’s work laid the groundwork for the develop-
ment of hybrid crops in the second and third decades of the
twentieth century, greatly speeding the industrialization of U.S.
agriculture.  This rediscovery also heralded a shift in the balance
of agricultural seed research and development from the public to
the private sector.  Mendel’s discovery of the laws of heredity,
and subsequent technological discoveries that built on Mendel’s
Therefore, Sen asserts that starvation is not simply a function of food supply but one
that implicates distribution.  The quest should thus be to improve the distribution of
food across a community which necessarily involves scrutinizing the workings of the
economic system. See AMARTYA SEN, POVERTY AND FAMINES:  AN ESSAY ON EN-
TITLEMENT AND DEPRIVATION 7-8 (1981).  The lack of food security has been de-
scribed as “an extraordinarily complex social, economic, and political problem
whose causes and solutions vary from country to country.”  While some nations,
especially in Asia, have made great strides in increasing agricultural productivity to
the extent that they are now net exporters of food, many in these nations still go
hungry as a result not having the economic means to purchase or produce the food
they need to subsist on. See Michael R. Taylor & Jerry Cayford, American Patent
Policy, Biotechnology, and African Agriculture:  The Case for Policy Change , 17
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 328 (2004).
8 Johann Gregor Mendel was born in Heinzendorf, Austria [present-day Hynice,
Czech Republic] on July 22, 1822.  In elementary school, Mendel was taught natural
science and encouraged to cultivate fruit trees.  After becoming a monk in 1843,
Mendel entered the Augustinian Monastery—a haven of learning and scientific en-
deavor.  He later attended the University of Vienna.  He then was placed as a substi-
tute teacher at the Brünn Technical School, a position he held until 1868 when he
gave up teaching.  Mendel published thirteen papers, two on plant-damaging insects,
nine on meteorology, and two on plant hybrids, his most important.  The papers on
plant hybrids were published in Verhandlungen des Naturforschenden Vereins in
Brünn  (1863 to 1871).  Mendel lived until January 6, 1884. AMERICAN COUNCIL OF
LEARNED SOCIETIES, Volume IX, DICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY 277-83.
9 In 1899 the Royal Horticultural Society organized the International Conference
on Hybridisation and on Cross-Breeding of Varieties featuring prominent scientists,
including H.J.  Webber of the USDA’s Plant Breeding Laboratory and Liberty Hyde
Bailey of Cornell University.  Some participants predicted that science was soon to
make a significant impact on plant breeding.  A year later, European botanists Hugo
de Vries, Carl Correns, and Erich Tschermak independently published papers de-
tailing rules of heredity that were later found to have been previously proposed by
Gregor Mendel thirty-five years earlier.  Across the Atlantic, a Washington State
Experiment Station wheat breeder ensured the acceptance of these new theories in
the United States when he came very close to an independent rediscovery of Mende-
lian inheritance in 1901. JACK KLOPPENBURG, FIRST THE SEED 68-69 (1986).
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work, were crucial elements in the rise of the agricultural life sci-
ences industry in the late twentieth century.
Monsanto was a St. Louis-based chemical company that came
to be one of the dominant agricultural chemical suppliers as the
so-called “Green Revolution” swept the globe in the 1970s.10
The Green Revolution entailed a global economic dislocation of
subsistence farmers as small, locally adopted agricultural prac-
tices were displaced with mass industrial farming techniques (and
the attendant expensive, high-input fertilizers, pesticides, herbi-
cides, and other chemical inputs designed to allow “one seed to
feed the world.”).11  By the 1980s, however, the Green Revolu-
tion was beginning to be seen as having a disastrous effect on the
preservation of plant genetic diversity worldwide as well as
bringing about harmful levels of environmental degradation due
in large part to fertilizer, pesticide, and herbicide runoff.12
10 Scientists working under the auspices of the Rockefeller and Ford foundations,
which funded international agricultural research centers, were the main catalysts be-
hind the Green Revolution.  These two foundations had united, disparate, and pri-
vately funded centers into a coordinated network in the hope of side-stepping the
bureaucracy of the U.N. system while, at the same time, exploiting the legitimacy
that comes with the perception of being part of the U.N. system. CARY FOWLER,
UNNATURAL SELECTION: TECHNOLOGY, POLITICS, AND PLANT EVOLUTION 182-83
(1994).
11 The fear that the world would not be able to feed its ever-increasing population,
especially in the developing world, was the concern that led to the Green Revolu-
tion.  The Green Revolution inevitably caused the spread of modern agriculture
worldwide.  This new agriculture relied heavily on chemical inputs, machinery, tech-
nology, research and development networks, and state-supported investment.  Eliza-
beth Bowles, Andhra Pradesh, India, as a Case Study in Perspectives on GMO’s , 34
Cumb. L. Rev. 415, 415 (2004); see also CARY FOWLER & PAT MOONEY, SHATTER-
ING: FOOD, POLITICS, AND THE LOSS OF GENETIC DIVERSITY 130-31 (1990) (stating
that due to their reliance on chemical inputs and farm machinery the seeds devel-
oped as part of the Green Revolution opened up the world to agrichemical con-
cerns).  For a comprehensive discussion on the Green Revolution, see JACK DOYLE,
ALTERED HARVEST: AGRICULTURE, GENETICS, AND THE FATE OF THE WORLD’S
FOOD SUPPLY 255-81 (1985); PAT R. MOONEY, SEEDS OF THE EARTH 37-46 (1979).
12 The success of the Green Revolution specifically in Punjab, India, as elsewhere,
was predicated on the displacement of genetic diversity on two levels.  First, mix-
tures of diverse crops like wheat, maize, millets, pulses, and oil seeds were replaced
by monocultures of wheat and rice.  Second, the wheat and rice introduced were
reproduced from large-scale monocultures that were derived from a very narrow
genetic base. See VANDANA SHIVA, THE VIOLENCE OF THE GREEN REVOLUTION 51
(1989).  The well-recognized costs to the environment as a result of the Green
Revolution’s promotion of irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides include
fertilizer and pesticide runoff into surface waters, and greater soil erosion.  See Tay-
lor & Cayford, supra note 7, at 328 n.19 (citing GORDON CONWAY, THE DOUBLY R
GREEN REVOLUTION:  FOOD FOR ALL IN THE 21ST CENTURY (1999)).  The increased
use of pesticides specifically is significant.  Of the estimated 2.5 million tonnes of
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In the wake of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1980 case, Diamond
v. Chakrabarty ,13 a partial, if ultimately unsatisfactory, solution
to the problems of high-input industrial agriculture began to be
pursued by companies like Monsanto—genetic engineering.  Be-
cause genetically engineered (GE) crops could be “designed” to
produce their own pest and weed resistance or be adapted to
grow in poor soil conditions of salinity or drought, genetic engi-
neering researchers argued that GE crops presented a way out of
the destructive cycles of high-chemical input agriculture.14  By
the mid-1990s, after discovering a delivery method to treat seeds
(the “DNA Gun”),15 Monsanto’s GE cotton, corn, soybeans, and
pesticides applied annually worldwide, only 0.3% reach the intended target with the
remainder going into the environment as runoff, or by seepage into groundwater,
volatilization into the air, intake by plants and soil organisms, or retention in the
soil.  Paula Barrios, The Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals:  A Mean-
ingful Step Toward Environmental Protection? , 16 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 679,
688 (2004).
13 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
14 Opponents of the unchecked spread of genetically modified seeds see it differ-
ently.  They point to Monsanto’s “Roundup-Ready” crops.  These are genetically
modified crops designed to be resistant to the herbicide glyphosate so that all other
unwanted vegetation is wiped out after spraying, leaving only the Roundup-Ready
crop in place.  However, when wind or bees transfer pollen from Roundup-Ready
plants to wild plants, herbicide-resistant “super-weeds” may spring up.  These super-
weeds may call for the use of more potent and thus highly toxic conventional herbi-
cides. See  Kristin Dawkins, Unsafe in Any Seed, U.S. Obstructionism Defeats Adop-
tion of an International Biosafety Agreement , MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, March
1999, at 3, 13, available at  http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm1999/mm9903.05.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2005); Ronnie Cummins, Hazards of Genetically Engineered
Foods and Crops:  Why We Need a Global Moratorium , available at  http://
www.inmotionmagazine. com/geff4.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).  In a related
vein, a report authored by consultant Charles Benbrook of the Northwest Science
and Environment Policy Center in Sandpoint, Idaho, using data from the U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture, contends that farmers are using more herbicide than ever
before despite industry claims to the contrary.  According to Benbrook, farmers ap-
plied 11.4 percent more herbicide on Roundup-Ready fields when compared with
fields treated with conventional herbicides.  Tina Hesman, Report Says Monsanto’s
Roundup Could Become Victim of Its Success,  St. Louis Post-Dispatch, May 3, 2001,
at C5.
15 The “DNA Gun” is also referred to as the Gene Gun or Bioblaster.  The tech-
nology at the heart of this innovation is Particle Gun Bombardment or Biolistic
(bio logy + ballistic). This technology was developed by John Sanford, an electrical
engineer at Cornell University, and permits the delivery of naked DNA into intact
plant cells by accelerating dense DNA-coated microparticles by means of an explo-
sion of sufficient velocity to penetrate the cell wall.  The gun uses a .22 caliber car-
tridge as the means to deliver genetically coated particles into cultured cells.  This
process has been utilized to add genes to corn cells, which produced fertile plants
and passed on the desired traits in new viable seeds. See  P. Vain et al., Foreign Gene
Delivery into Monocotyledonous Species , 13 BIOTECHNOLOGY ADVANCES 658
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canola were positioned to take the U.S. and Canadian markets
by storm.
However, while Monsanto’s GE crops were able to quickly
dominate the North American market, they ran into considera-
ble trouble with public acceptance in the European Union (EU),
especially in the United Kingdom and France (countries wary of
the unknown hazards arising from the introduction of GE crops
into the food chain and the environment).16  In the late 1990s,
Monsanto ran into a public relations nightmare when non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) such as the Action Group on
Erosion, Technology and Concentration and its predecessor, and
the Rural Advancement Foundation International undertook an
anti-Monsanto campaign that focused on Monsanto’s licensing of
what these NGOs called “Terminator” technology.17  Terminator
technology is a genetic engineering technique that renders crops
sterile so that seed saving by farmers is futile.
The EU imposed a moratorium on the import of GE crops,
which it began to lift in 2004.18  Thus, at the beginning of the
(1995); Gregory Morris, Gene Gun Targets Corn , CHEMICAL WEEK, May 23, 1990, at
24.
16 Owing to the mostly unfavorable coverage of these so-called “Frankenstein”
foods in the European press, protests in Europe against their introduction consist-
ently enjoyed front-page treatment whereas the American press dismissed protests
here as insignificant.  This European media coverage ranged from cautious question-
ing to outright panic.  Moreover, the European consumers were supposedly less
likely than their American counterparts to trust the judgment of authorities in the
wake of a series of highly publicized food scares. See  Julian Borger, How the
Mightly Fall , THE GUARDIAN, Manchester (UK), Nov. 22, 1999, at 2.  It is also note-
worthy that European concerns extended beyond any unidentified hazards to
human health.  These concerns also encompassed economic and social considera-
tions such as a decline in European market dominance and competitive advantage
and a feared upsurge in dependence on the North American biotechnology industry.
Young-Gyoo Shim, Intellectual Property Protection of Biotechnology and Sustainable
Development in International Law , 29 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 157, 177 (2003).
17 See  Neil D. Hamilton, Legal Issues Shaping Society’s Acceptance of Biotechnol-
ogy and Genetically Modified Organisms , 6 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 81, 106-09 (2001).
The ETC website is located at http://www.etcgroup.org.  Other NGOs include
Greenpeace (online at http://www.greenpeace.org).
18 For documents associated with this moratorium see Council Directive 2001/18/
EC, 2001 O.J. (L 106) 1 (and its predecessor, Council Directive 90/220, 1990 O.J. (L
117) 15, as amended by Council Directive 94/15, 1994 O.J. (L 103) 20 and Council
Directive 97/35/EC, 1997 O.J. (L 169) 72); and Council Regulation 258/97, 1997 O.J.
(L 043) 1.  In late October 2004, the European Union approved Monsanto’s
Roundup Ready corn NK603 and its processed products as food and food ingredi-
ents under the European Union’s novel foods regulation, signaling the end of the
five-year moratorium on new trait approvals. See  Patricia Van Arnum, Ag Biotech
Gains Momentum , CHEMICAL MARKET REPORTER, Nov. 8, 2004, at FR16.  Three
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twenty-first century, the trends exemplified by Malthus, Mendel,
and Monsanto converge on the subject of plant genetic resources
(PGR).  These trends are increasingly articulated in the common
language of intellectual property protection.  First, this Introduc-
tion will briefly look at crop development and agriculture in a
historical sense.  Second, this Introduction will examine the
emergence of a variety of different regimes for protecting PGR
as intellectual property and how tensions and synergies between
different national and legal regimes have been producing new
and interesting legal treatments of PGR, such as the Interna-
tional Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources.19  Third, this Introduc-
tion will discuss changes in the ways that access to PGR via
international and national seed germplasm banks has been af-
months earlier, the E U had approved the importation of genetically modified corn
for use as animal feed. See  Elizabeth Becker, Europe Approves Genetically Modi-
fied Corn as Animal Feed , N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2004, at C11.  The Cartagena Proto-
col, an agreement that promotes trade in biotechnology products that are
environmentally safe, offers some, albeit little, comfort to those still opposed to the
unbridled entry of genetically altered foods and food products, in that it mandates
that shipment of such products clearly identify that they may contain living modified
organisms. See  Howard Mann, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety:  An Analysis ,
June 1, 2000, available at  http://www.isdlaw. com/docs/ASEAN%20-
Mann%20paper.doc (last visited Jan. 27, 2005) [hereinafter Cartagena Protocol
Analysis]; Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diver-
sity, Jan. 29, 2000, art. 18(2)(a), 39 I.L.M. 1027, 1035 (2000).  However, this labeling
requirement is only required for transportation purposes and does not necessarily
extend to subsequent consumer retailing. See  Cartagena Protocol Analysis, at 9.
Two months before the Protocol went into effect, a relatively obscure U.N. agency,
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, with the backing of all 168 member states,
produced the first set of international guidelines for assessing and managing health
risks posed by GM foods.  The most significant guideline called for safety assess-
ments of all GM foods prior to their approval for commercial sale.  Phil Bereano &
Eliott Peacock, Harmony or Havoc; Can the WTO, Biosafety Protocol and Codex
Alimentarius Work Together? , Sci. and Dev. Network, Jan. 2005, available at  http://
www.scidev.net/dossiers/index.cfm? fuseaction=policybrief &dossier=6&policy=54
(last visited Mar. 4, 2005). See also  Codex Alimentarius, available at http://
www.codexalimentarius.net/web/index_en.jsp (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
19 International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture,
Nov. 3, 2001, available at  ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/it/ITPGRe.pdf (last visited
Mar. 9, 2005) [hereinafter ITPGR].  This treaty is aimed at governing the interna-
tional exchange of plant genetic resources.  In November 2001, delegates from 116
countries voted to adopt the ITPGR, which was to enter into force only when at
least 40 nations either ratified or acceded to it. See  Kelly Day-Rubenstein & Paul
Heisey, Plant Genetic Resources , AMBER WAVES, June 2003, at 22.  The 40 nation
threshold was surpassed when twelve European nations and the European Commu-
nity ratified the treaty triggering a 90 day countdown that culminated in the treaty
going into effect on June 29, 2004. Biodiversity Treaty Signed, SOUTHWEST FARM
PRESS, Apr. 15, 2004, available at  http://southwestfarmpress.com/mag/ farm-
ing_biodiversity _treaty_signed/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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fected by the rise of intellectual property rights in PGR.  Finally,
this Introduction will briefly review the five papers presented at
the conference.
II
WHAT IS AT STAKE?
Due to the convergence of a number of trends, plant genetic
diversity is being lost as industrialized agriculture replaces tradi-
tional crop strains with increasingly uniform varieties.20  In the
mid-twentieth century, Rockefeller Foundation-backed institu-
tions established “seed banks” in order to conserve rapidly disap-
pearing genetic diversity.21  As the means to breed resistance
into crops is lost, there is a risk of increased dependence on
chemical fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides, which have the
ironic effect of breeding resistance into weeds, insects, and
diseases.22
20 Jack Kloppenburg notes that genetic diversity is an enemy of mechanization.
For example, the genetic variability of open-pollinated corn posed grave problems to
agricultural engineers whose task it was to mechanize the farming process.  These
plants not only bore different numbers of ears at different places on their stalks but
also ripened at variable rates making mechanization of farming processes even more
difficult.  Thus, mechanization was one among many significant catalysts in the move
towards genetic uniformity. See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 9, at 117.
21 The Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) was
formed on the initiative of the Rockefeller Foundation and acts as the parent body
of a network of international agricultural research centers.  These centers which in-
clude the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mex-
ico and the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), among others, have served
as “major collectors and storage sites for germplasm.” See FOWLER & MOONEY,
supra  note 11, at 182-83.  Most of these centers have local or regional responsibili-
ties in collecting germplasm; only a small number have global responsibilities.  The
International Plant Genetic Resources Institute (IPGRI) is a center with the unique
task of coordinating the activities of the other centers in addition to providing mone-
tary support for some non-CGIAR conservation facilities.  Gregory Rose, Interna-
tional Law of Sustainable Agriculture in the 21st Century:  The International Treaty
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture , 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
583, 593-94 (2003).  For more on gene banks, see generally DONALD L. PLUCKNETT
ET AL., GENE BANKS AND THE WORLD’S FOOD SUPPLY (1987); Nat’l Research
Council, Managing Global Genetic Resources (discussing the task that befalls the
National Plant Germplasm System in the United States).
22 Genetic uniformity has led to an unstable and unbalanced plant pathosystem
which now risks relying exclusively on chemical inputs.  Without these inputs, crops
could either not be grown at all or would suffer unbearable reduction in yield and
quality. RAOUL A. ROBINSON, RETURN TO RESISTANCE:  BREEDING CROPS TO RE-
DUCE PESTICIDE DEPENDENCE 71 (1996).  The biotechnology industry played no
small role in creating this predicament owing to its focus on creating herbicide-resis-
tant and pesticide-tolerant crops that would survive when fields are sprayed with
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Who should control this genetic diversity?  The historical
“baseline” is that different regions of the earth have dramatically
different endowments of economically important plant species.
Because of the Ice Age, and the geography of early human settle-
ments and migrations, most cultivated and natural genetic diver-
sity in plant species and varieties originated in equatorial regions
and the southern hemisphere.23  Indeed, beginning in the six-
teenth century, one of the major features of colonialism was a
contest among the imperial powers over extraction, transplanta-
tion, and exploitation of PGR.24
Until the late-nineteenth century, the conservation of genetic
diversity was dependent on the mass selection of plant popula-
tions by farmers and botanists in state botanical gardens such as
Kew Gardens in England.25  “Ownership” of genetic resources
could be framed in terms of national sovereignty despite in-
stances in the nineteenth century when foreign powers defied
chemicals.  Some fear that the widespread use of herbicide-resistant and pesticide-
tolerant crops will lead to the evolution of resistance to these chemical inputs.  For
example, it may lead to the creation of “super-weeds,” as briefly discussed supra
note 14.  The use of plants genetically engineered to contain genes for pesticides,
like the Bt Toxin, “may encourage the selection of rare resistant genes in the pest
population,” thus rendering the pesticide ineffective in the long run.  Elizabeth Du-
all, Note, A Liability and Redress Regime for Genetically Modified Organisms Under
the Cartagena Protocol , 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 173, 187 (2004).
23 While the northern hemisphere was severely impacted by the Ice Age, hunting
and gathering flourished in the south.  Agriculture first began in the warmer lands of
the south, where a long history of interactions between human and plants played the
key role in developing the extensive genetic diversity which is the foundation of
modern agriculture. See FOWLER, supra  note 10, at 4. R
24 Unlike valuable mineral resources, e.g. , gold and silver, which can only be ex-
tracted once, plant germplasm came to be seen as a resource in which a single taking
had the potential of providing a material base through which whole new sectors of
production could be developed.  This realization led imperial powers to shift focus
from precious metals to germplasm.  As a result, plant and seed transfers became
important both in political and economic terms inspiring measures by the Dutch,
English, and French to keep useful materials out of each others’ hands. See KLOP-
PENBURG, supra note 9, at 154. R
25 The earliest botanical gardens were those established with the mandate to study
medicinal plants.  The gardens in Florence, Leiden, Leipzig, Montpellier, Pisa, and
Heidelberg were founded in the sixteenth century and were associated with medical
faculties at universities.  By the end of the eighteenth century, an estimated 1600
gardens existed in Europe alone.  It was at this point that plant materials were evalu-
ated for other possible uses including food and industrial use.  The Royal Botanic
Gardens at Kew on the outskirts of London was the world’s leading botanic garden
as of the nineteenth century owing to Britain’s expansive economic and colonial
powers.  Kew played a pivotal role in developing and disseminating important eco-
nomic plants.  For more on botanic gardens in Europe, see FOWLER, supra  note 10, R
at 6-14.
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\19-2\OEL204.txt unknown Seq: 12  2-MAY-05 12:33
408 J. ENVTL. LAW AND LITIGATION [Vol. 19, 2004]
sovereign edicts (as happened in Brazil when rubber trees were
smuggled out contrary to the state’s express wishes).26  Cur-
rently, under the international system of seed/gene banks estab-
lished in the 1960s and 1970s,27 ownership of germplasm is vested
in the country where the seed bank is located28—many of the
largest seed banks are located in countries of the North, such as
the United States.
Even before the advent of genetic engineering, ownership of
genetic resources proved vexing.  For example, should a plant
breeder who develops a new variety of disease-resistant wheat be
called the owner of that variety?  If ownership and property
rights in that particular plant variety vest in the plant breeder,
what about the farmer or farming community that first identified
and conserved the disease-resistant variety that the plant breeder
relied on?  What acknowledgement should we make, if any, to
the generations of Neolithic ancestors who cultivated wild weeds,
transforming them into domesticated crops?
III
CONTROVERSIES OVER CROP DEVELOPMENT
AND AGRICULTURE
Human beings began cultivating plants approximately twelve
thousand years ago as humans transitioned from hunter-gather-
ers to agriculturalists.29  While this move to cultivation entailed a
focus on a relatively small number of plant species, within those
species genetic diversity thrived as crops traveled with people
and were adapted through mass selection to new pests, diseases,
soils, climates, and human cultures.  This plant genetic diversity,
developed over ten millennia, is crucial for the continued viabil-
ity of major agricultural crops as farmers, plant breeders, and bi-
ologists draw upon this genetic diversity to adapt crop species to
new pests, diseases, and other environmental changes.
26 LUCILLE H. BROCKAWAY, PLANT SCIENCE AND COLONIAL EXPANSION: THE
BOTANICAL CHESS GAME 57-58 (Jack Kloppenburg ed., 1988) (In smuggling 70,000
rubber seeds out of Brazil in 1876, “Britain had no conceivable national security
reason for invading Brazil’s sovereignty by surrepticiously removing one of its natu-
ral resources; it had merely an economic incentive and, in the preautomotive era,
not a very strong one at that.”).
27 See  discussion of CGIAR system supra  note 21.
28 See  discussion of the sovereignty principle in CBD infra  Part IV.E.
29 FOWLER & MOONEY, supra  note 11, at 8.
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The treatment of crop genetic diversity has changed drastically
over the course of the past century.  The major food crops of the
world have genetic components that may be traced to many local
varieties developed by small subsistence farmers and farming
communities around the globe.  Until the late 1970s, these ge-
netic resources were characterized as the “common heritage of
humankind,”30 with the result that farmers, plant breeders, and
agricultural researchers had unrestricted and open access to ge-
netic resources.  Many of the procedures and norms of twentieth
century agricultural research and breeding institutions were de-
signed to facilitate open access to and the exchange of PGR with
the goal of promoting crop improvement.31
Control over plant genetic diversity is no less controversial
now than it was two hundred years ago when the colonial powers
vied for control of plantation crops.  Property institutions funda-
mentally shape a society; the legal constructs between individu-
als, objects, and the state are not always easy to justify, especially
in the realm of intellectual property.32  Should genetic resources
be characterized as the “common heritage of humankind?”  In
this context, “common heritage” is a misnomer because it implies
common ownership, but resources characterized as such are
available for entrepreneurs to use as the “raw materials” for in-
tellectual property, which is anything but held in common with
30 Plant genetic resources enjoy the unique distinction of being considered the
“common heritage of mankind,” or in other terms, humanity’s collective “genetic
estate.”  As a result, plant genetic resources have been available as a free good with
the only costs associated with their acquisition being the expenses inherent in the
collection of the same.  In contrast, resources such as coal, oil, and valuable minerals
do not share this distinction, even water may be commodified as wrangling over the
“Law of the Sea” shows.  While the West has all along been reluctant to confer this
“common heritage” status to resources that fall outside their boundaries, this reluc-
tance to confer this status does not seem to have been extended to plant genetic
resources.  See KLOPPENBURG, supra note 9, at 152.  For a comprehensive discussion R
on this concept of “common heritage,” see ANTHONY J. STENSON & TIM S. GRAY,
THE POLITICS OF GENETIC RESOURCE CONTROL 136-53 (1999).
31 Plant viruses claim up to four-fifths of the crops cultivated.  With increasing
global population calling for increased agricultural output, it has been argued that
making crops disease-resistant and immune is vital for future generations.  It has
been further stated that crop improvement through biotechnology, among other
means, leads to efficiency, productivity, and stability to an industry that is suscepti-
ble to pests, insects, and in most parts of the world, dependent on weather condi-
tions. See  Karen M. Graziano, Biosafety Protocol: Recommendations to Ensure the
Safety of the Environment , 7 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 179, 183-84 (1995).
32 Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property , 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31,
31 (1989), available at  http://www.jstor.org/view/00483915/di984935/98p0163c/0 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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others.  Should private individuals and firms be allowed to claim
exclusive ownership in assorted aspects and elements of genetic
resources?  If we do allow such private claims to be made, how
do we define, qualify, and tailor those newly minted rights?  To
what extent should national or supranational governments be in-
volved in establishing frameworks and rules regarding PGR?
Control and ownership are critical to the questions of how and
whether those PGR will be conserved.
The papers presented at the conference examine the question
of legal control over PGR in both public-private and national-
supranational spheres.  In the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the U.S. government was heavily involved in plant col-
lecting and “plant improvement,” and was also actively involved
in freely spreading seed germplasm and information as widely as
possible among U.S. farmers.  Thus, the U.S. government laid the
foundation for expanded commercial agriculture in the twentieth
century.33  In the United States, from the 1860s onward, land
grant universities played a major role in disseminating agricul-
tural information and germplasm by breeding plants tailored to
local soil, climate, and pest contexts.34  During the early twenti-
33 The United States may have been a latecomer in the colonial posturing for
plant resources, but this does not mean that it did not participate.  Early political
leaders including Thomas Jefferson, George Washington, and Benjamin Franklin
were enthusiastic importers of exotic plant material into the country.  Jefferson is
often quoted as noting that “[t]he greatest service which can be rendered to any
country is to add a useful plant to its culture.”  Most of the original seed stocks in the
United States were either brought into the country by immigrant families or im-
ported by the U.S. government.  Later, in the early part of the nineteenth century,
the U.S. government played an active role in obtaining crop diversity and facilitating
its testing and adaptation as a means of commercially expanding agriculture.  By
1878, the United States Department of Agriculture, created sixteen years earlier,
was spending a third of its budget on germplasm collection and distribution.  This
distribution entailed handing farmers enough seed to facilitate experimentation, but
not enough to supply commercial farming needs.  The U.S. government thus en-
couraged the individual farmer to be a selector, breeder, and multiplier of seed. See
FOWLER, supra  note 10, at 14-22. R
34 In 1862, the Morrill Act, infra  note 205, led to the creation of public land grant
universities on the premise that states should create centers of education that teach
“agriculture and the mechanic arts.”  Federal funds were disbursed to the various
states based on the number of each state’s congressional representatives providing
each state with an endowment to form at least one university, hence the term “land
grant university.”  In 1890, a second Morrill Act provided funding to support seven-
teen land grant institutions created especially to serve African Americans in south-
ern states.  As of 1994, when the Equity in Educational Land Grant Status created
twenty-nine Native American colleges in the western and plains states, the total
number of land grant universities had peaked in excess of 100.  SeeJames Stuart,
Comment, The Academic-Industrial Complex:  A Warning to Universities , 75 U.
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eth century, U.S. agriculture became increasingly rationalized
and industrialized, a trend that continues to date.  Specifically,
during the early twentieth century, many farmers stopped saving
seed and began producing for a commercial marketplace that fa-
vored crop uniformity and higher yields—marking the beginning
of a shift toward purchased seed stock.
In particular, patent and para-patent laws applicable to plants
emerged roughly during the first three decades of the twentieth
century.  These laws, however, are imperfect and incomplete in
their tracking of technological plant breeding advances such as
hybridization.  These laws did not arise because of new technolo-
gies, but in large part because of political pressure from nursery
companies trying to protect their market share in asexually re-
produced (cloned) trees produced through cuttings and grafting,
and because of deep structural changes in markets for agricul-
tural produce.  The 1930 Plant Patent Act35 was followed and ex-
panded by the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970,36 the 1980
Plant Variety Protection Act amendments,37 and judicial deci-
sions regarding the patent scope in terms of living organisms.38
Against the backdrop of these legal developments, the Green
Revolution occurred globally and the trend toward industrial-
ized, mass commercial agriculture that is highly dependent on
chemical inputs such as fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides con-
tinued.39  At the core of these developments is the attempt to
create legal mechanisms for the economic control of plants, plant
varieties, and ultimately, plant genes that express particular
traits.
This same mid-twentieth century period also brought changes
in the division of labor in the agricultural sector, both nationally
and internationally.  Land grant universities, which had en-
couraged and trained public plant breeders from the late nine-
COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1023-24 (2004).  These state-supported land grant universities
were part of the government’s undertaking in the task of plant improvement.  At the
time, it was apparent that a productive agricultural sector was contingent upon the
development of improved crop varieties.  Since private capital was lacking, it be-
came evident that social capital was needed to accomplish this development. KLOP-
PENBURG, supra  note 9, at 12. R
35 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (2000).
36 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (2000).
37 Pub. L. 96-574, § 20, Dec. 22, 1980, 94 Stat. 3352.
38 See  discussion infra  Part IV.A.2.a.
39 Taylor & Cayford, supra  note 12, at 328 n.19.
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teenth century onward, had their mission redefined.40  This
redefinition involved characterizing their role as one of basic sci-
entific agricultural research, as opposed to being in the business
of producing public plant breeds that were in competition with
breeds and hybrids produced by increasingly powerful private
sector companies such as Pioneer Hi-Bred, Garst Seeds, and Car-
gill.41  This displacement of public plant breeding from a central
to a marginal position not only cleared the way for the privatiza-
tion of seed production, but also meant the displacement of the
model of plant improvement  that emphasized free exchange of
seed germplasm, breeding techniques, and information.  These
plant improvement practices had the effect of maintaining and
enlarging plant genetic diversity.  Public plant breeds were re-
placed with hybrids developed from closed proprietary lines—
heralding a move towards asserting legally protected rights in
new plant varieties and away from enlarging plant genetic
diversity.42
By the late 1970s, North American and European agricultural
activists and authors began voicing concerns that “the genetic
base of the world’s food supply was quickly disappearing and
that restrictive legislation was making it possible for agribusiness
40 The public agricultural research system had been the target of critics who ques-
tioned the quality of its work.  The land grant universities along with the USDA
were accused of parochialism, bureaucratic inefficiency, and inability or unwilling-
ness to support critical research.  A report issued jointly by the Rockefeller Founda-
tion and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, which came to
be known as the Winrock Report, warned that unless the current situation was im-
proved, the nation would not be in a position to harness the benefits of newly
emerging advances in biotechnology. See KLOPPENBURG, supra  note 9, at 235. R
41 The Winrock Report provided a template for reforming public agricultural re-
search along lines more amenable to the needs of capital.  This reform would be
accomplished in three ways.  First, the highly decentralized system that existed pre-
viously would be streamlined; part of this streamlining process involved creating a
competitive grant system by which institutions outside the land grant system could
access funds administered by the USDA.  Second, research and the associated fund-
ing would be redirected to basic scientific research.  Third, industry would have a
greater opportunity in determining social division of labor in agricultural research.
See KLOPPENBURG, supra  note 9, 235-6. R
42 See generally  Keith Aoki, Weeds, Seeds & Deeds:  Recent Skirmishes in the Seed
Wars , 11 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 247, 278-80 (2003) (The nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries provided ample genetic diversity for both public and pri-
vate plant breeders to introduce new traits into the cultivated varieties.  However,
this process has now become a booming market through which proprietary varieties
are introduced with the accompanying genetic uniformity.).
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to gain control of this vital segment of the total food system.”43
These comments were the genesis of arguments arising from
newly-emerging NGOs that were severely critical of the spread
of industrialized agriculture in the so-called third world44 with a
particular focus on plant breeding and crop improvement.45
NGOs advanced their cause by employing several arguments.
First, they argued that crop development policies and practices
were effectively destroying the genetic base essential to plant
breeding.46 Because the Green Revolution drove the spread of
new, high-yielding, uniform varieties (which were replacing tradi-
tional farmer landraces and their wild and weedy relatives), in-
dustrialized agriculture was accelerating the global erosion of
plant genetic diversity.  Second, the NGOs argued that there was
a serious South-North appropriation of plant genetic diversity
that went uncompensated because such resources were treated
legally as the “common heritage of humankind.”47  Third, that
throughout the last third of the twentieth century, the multina-
tional chemical, pharmaceutical, and food processing corpora-
tions acquired control of smaller seed supply companies, thereby
producing a striking economic concentration in the seed sector.48
These corporations acquired smaller companies, gained control
and access to unique seed and/or gene libraries, converted them
into proprietary resources, and used the libraries to create new
plant varieties suited to industrialized agriculture.  In many in-
stances, the proprietary resources were protected by plant breed-
ers’ rights or patents, meaning that these seeds could not be
legally reproduced by farmers beyond the first sale.49  The final
set of claims centered on the concern that the rise of intellectual
property rights in PGR for food and agriculture had slowed
down or stopped the transfer of new crop development technol-
43 Meeting in Canada under the aegis of the International Coalition for Develop-
ment Action (ICDA), these authors and activists expressed concern about crop de-
velopment and the world food supply in general and seed in particular.  The book,
Seeds of the Earth authored by R. Pat Mooney, resulted from this conference.  The
concerns vocalized in the conference and articulated in Seeds of the Earth were
developed further by other authors. ROBIN PISTORIUS & JEROEN VAN WIJK, THE
EXPLOITATION OF PLANT GENETIC INFORMATION:  POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN CROP
DEVELOPMENT 8 (1999).
44 See id .
45 Id . at 8-10.
46 Id . at 9.
47 Id .
48 Id .
49 Id . at 10.
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ogy to farmers in the developing world.  The technology con-
tained in seeds and chemicals was protected by intellectual
property rights that farmers risked infringing if they used such
seeds and chemicals.50  However, if they did not, they risked be-
ing driven out of their markets by farmers employing the tech-
nologies.51  Additionally, such intellectual property rights were
seen as creating a dependence on agrochemical companies and
leading to a striking decline in traditional subsistence farming
practices in the developing world, such as seed saving by
farmers.52
The conference’s purpose was not to critique genetic engineer-
ing per se, or to engage in a general neo-Luddite bashing of ge-
netics or genomics.  Indeed, one might consider the ten thousand
year history of human selection, cultivation, and transformation
of wild landraces into our current domesticated agricultural crops
as a history of human intervention in and alteration of plant ge-
nomes—kimchi, bread, and beer being some of the earliest fruits
of human biotechnical tampering with nature.  However, the
marked trends toward centralization and privatization of PGR
gives rise to a critique of genetic engineering techniques that fa-
cilitate commodification of seed germplasm and concentration of
control over such resources.  The vision of “one seed that feeds
the world” may lead to dystopian results.
50 While these new varieties were developed using genetic resources acquired
from developing nations, these poorer nations are precluded from exploiting the
new varieties without the consent of the respective developers.  This situation has
been seen by some as not only being unfair, but also a hindrance to agricultural
development in these poorer countries. Id . at 10.
51 This is just one of the criticisms leveled against the technology transfer provi-
sions under TRIPS, discussion infra  note 54, from the perspective of the developing
world. See also  Donald P. Harris, TRIPS’ Rebound:  An Historical Analysis of How
the TRIPS Agreement Can Ricochet Back Against the United States, 25 NW. J. INT’L
L. & BUS. 99, 108-09 (2004) (stating that while the long-term positive effects of
TRIPS’ technology transfer provisions are yet to come to fruition in addition to
being questionable, the short-term negative effects are fully apparent).
52 The extension of intellectual property rights to plant genetic resources threat-
ens to eliminate farming as it has been practiced over the last ten millennia.  For
instance, patents protecting Terminator Technology—technology which renders
seeds infertile—have led to the dependence on the ever expensive modified seed
and chemical inputs from a handful of global biotechnology companies at the ex-
pense of farmers’ ability to save and share the seed.  As a consequence, family and
indigenous farmers risk being driven off the land owing to the march toward “bi-
oserfdom” whereby farmers have no choice but to license, or conceivably “lease,”
the crops they wish to cultivate from the conglomerates. See generally  Cummins,
supra  note 14.
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IV
OVERLAPPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES FOR
PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES
To understand the complex contemporary state of intellectual
property protection for PGR for food and agriculture, one needs
to go back to the early 1980s and look at controversies over the
exploitation of such resources.  The papers presented at the
Malthus, Mendel and Monsanto symposium also focus on how
the controversies over intellectual property rights in PGR (both
on the individual level of patent-like protection, and the national
level of control of banked seed germplasm) have played out (and
are playing out) on the international level.  This Introduction
analyzes and critiques developments such as the 1992 Biodivers-
ity Conference and the resulting Convention on Biodiversity
(CBD), the 2001 Cartegena Protocol,53 the creation of the World
Trade Organization, the ongoing implementation of the Agree-
ment on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
(TRIPS),54 and the 2001 Doha Round55 and its subsequent col-
lapse in Cancun in the summer of 2003.56  Also considered is the
53 For a study on the achievements, limitations, and implications of the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, see MICHAEL GRUBB ET AL., THE
EARTH SUMMIT AGREEMENTS: A GUIDE AND ASSESSMENT 75-82 (1993).
54 Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15,
1994, Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Including Trade, 33 I.L.M. 81, 84 [hereinafter TRIPS]. See also  The Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
1867 U.N.T.S. 19, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994).  This agreement was signed by ministers in
Marrakech, Morocco on April 15, 1994, and was meant to clarify the results of the
negotiations since the Round was launched in Punta del Este, Uruguay, in Septem-
ber 1986.  A summary of the Final Act of the Uruguay Round is available online at
the WTO website at http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/ursum_e.htm#n
Agreement (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).  For a comprehensive analysis of the TRIPS
agreement and its history see DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT:  DRAFT-
ING HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (2003). See also INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN
THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11-47 (Jayashree Watal ed., 2001).
55 In November 2001, the WTO meeting in Doha, Qatar set in motion discussion
meant to further liberalize global trade, this time bearing in mind the needs of
poorer nations.  However, there were sticking points which were not ultimately re-
solved, mainly agricultural subsidies.  The Doha Round was meant to “reduce trade-
distorting farm support, slash tariffs on farm goods and eliminate agricultural-export
subsidies in areas poor countries cared about, such as textiles.” The WTO Under
Fire—The Doha Round , THE ECONOMIST (U.S. Edition), Sept. 20, 2003, at 26.  For
documents relating to the Doha Round visit http://www.wto.org/english/ tratop_e/
dda_e/dda_e.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
56 The Cancun negotiations were doomed from the start as countries seemed to
disavow significant parts of the Doha Round.  The E U, for example, denied it had
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network of international agricultural research stations and seed
conservation banks administered by the Rockefeller Foundation
Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research
(CGIAR)57 and the role of the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion of the United Nations (FAO).58
One cannot consider the past two decades of legal and techno-
logical development without taking account of the heavy influx
of investment into biotechnology following the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Diamond v. Chakrabarty59 decision in 1980 and the sub-
sequent rise of recombinant DNA technology.  This new technol-
ogy allowed corporate plant breeders to manipulate genetic
sequences of plants on the finely-tuned molecular level and ac-
quire an exclusive (though temporally limited) monopoly in
those sequences that expressed particular plant traits.60  This shift
occurred contemporaneously with passage of the Bayh-Dole
Act,61 which mandated the patenting of inventions of all kinds
produced at public research universities receiving federal fund-
agreed to get rid of export subsidies.  Poorer countries for their part denied they
assented to participating in talks on new rules.  Agriculture was the biggest issue
dividing negotiators.  To ease the stalemate, the E U and the United States proposed
a framework to free farm trade.  This framework, however, was rejected by poor
nations who felt it did not go far enough, export subsidies would remain in place for
instance. See The WTO Under Fire— The Doha Round , supra  note 55, at 26-27.
57 FOWLER, supra  note 10, at 182-83. See also discussion supra note 21.
58 The FAO is a United Nations agency mandated to lead international efforts in
the fight against hunger.  It is meant to be a neutral forum where all member nations
meet as equals to debate policy and negotiate agreements in addition to aiding de-
veloping countries in their transition towards modern agriculture, forestry, and fish-
eries practices.  More information on the FAO and its activities is available at  http://
www.fao.org/UNFAO/about/index_en.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
59 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
60 New genetic information can now be incorporated into an organism’s pre-ex-
isting DNA through a number of recombinant DNA techniques.  One technique is
gene splicing whereby scientists first isolate the gene responsible for the trait they
would like to transfer to the target organism.  This isolation is accomplished using
restrictive enzymes — chemicals which break the DNA into fragments.  The next
step is to transfer the isolated gene to the target which could by done by use of a
weakened bacterium to infect the target organism; if all goes as planned, the bacte-
rium transfers the new DNA into the chromosomes of the host.  Cynthia C. Urbano,
Gene Splicing:  How Does It Work and What Can It Do? , AMERICAN NURSERYMAN,
Oct. 15, 2004, at 44.
61 Bayh-Dole University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act, Pub. L. No.
96-517, § 6(a), 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3015, 3018-29 (1980) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 200-
212 (2000)).  For a discussion on the impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on University-
based research in the scientific realm, see Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine , 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
289 (2003).
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ing.  The Bayh-Doyle Act triggered new policies mandating trade
secrecy regarding any potentially patentable inventions (includ-
ing possible patents in living organisms).
This Introduction will first briefly introduce the protections
available to plant breeders prior to the landmark 1980
Chakrabarty  decision.  It then examines developments in U.S. in-
tellectual property law vis-a-vis plants from 1980 onward as a
backdrop to a discussion of the emergence of concurrent interna-
tional and transnational legal regimes regarding PGR.
A. Changes in U.S. Intellectual Property Law, 1980-2004
1. Overview of Pre-1980 Protection for Plants
a. U.S. Patent Law in General
A positive, express grant in the U.S. Constitution facilitated
the emergence of the U.S. patent regime.62  The grant of a patent
is tantamount to the grant of a statutory monopoly.63 There are
several rationales that support granting a patent monopoly to an
inventor.  The first, the “incentive theory,” is the most widely ac-
cepted rationale.64  This theory posits that the grant of exclusive
rights creates an incentive for inventors to develop new products
or processes.65  The second rationale is that exclusive rights facili-
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the broad power to legislate in
order to “promote the Progress of Science useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Dis-
coveries.”).  In exercising this authority, Congress enacted the first Patent Act (now
codified as 35 U.S.C. § 101) which President George Washington signed into law on
April 10, 1790. See  David R. Nicholson, Agricultural Biotechnology and Genetically-
Modified Foods:  Will the Developing World Bite? , 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 7, 17 (2003).
63 A patent is a privilege granted to an inventor as a reward for furthering “sci-
ence and the useful arts” by creating an invention and disclosing it to the public.
The patent privilege, however, does not grant the holder the exclusive right to use,
make or sell his invention; it only prevents others from doing so without the patent
holder’s permission. See  Susan E. Gustad, Legal Ownership of Plant Genetic Re-
sources—Fewer Options for Farmers , 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 459, 461 (1995).
64 Kenneth L. Port, Foreward:  Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory ,
68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 585, 591 (1993).
65 In granting this exclusive right, in effect, excluding others from appropriating
the particular invention without the inventor’s consent, the state enables inventors
to not only recoup the associated developmental costs but also, more importantly,
financially benefit from their inventions with the ultimate goal being the progress of
the sciences. See  David G. Scalise & David Nugent, International Intellectual Prop-
erty Protections for Living Matter:  Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and
the Exceptions for Agriculture,  27 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 83, 86-87 (1995).
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tate the dissemination of useful information.66  Finally, there is
the natural rights argument—an inventor ought to own title of
the creations of the inventor’s mind.67
Patents issued under 35 U.S.C. § 101 are referred to as utility
patents on account of the requirement that a patentable inven-
tion under this section be useful.68  Generally, patent law pro-
tects inventions that are novel,69 nonobvious,70 and useful.71  The
subject matter eligibility provisions under § 101 designate “four
broad categories of patent-eligible subject matter: compositions,
machines, articles of manufacture, and processes.”72  While pat-
entable subject matter includes “any new and useful process, ma-
chine, manufacture or composition of matter or any new and
useful improvement thereof,”73 mathematical formulae, and nat-
ural laws, and products of nature are generally considered as
unpatentable.74
66 Without adequate legal protections, inventors would be likely to shroud their
new ideas in secrecy while attempting to realize commercial value.  Such secrecy
would lead to an inefficient and duplicative research process.  Current patent law
statutes seek to reverse this tendency by mandating the full disclosure of the pat-
ented products or processes. Disclosed information becomes freely available to the
public thus permitting the development of derivative inventions once patent holders
are compensated. Id . at 87.
67 Port, supra  note 64, at 591 (further noting that since a statute cannot grant or
deny rights in one’s own intellectual creations, “an inventor has title in and to these
inventions regardless of any statutory monopoly”).
68 Michael T. Roberts, National Aglaw Center Research Article, J.E.M. AG Sup-
ply, Inc., v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.: Its Meaning and Significance for the
Agricultural Community , 28 S. ILL. U. L.J. 91, 97 (2003).
69 The single source rule is utilized in order to determine whether an invention is
novel.  An invention is not novel if a single instance of prior art discloses each
claimed element.  For example, if an article described the elements of a machine
prior to the patent application, the application would be held invalid since the article
was already anticipated.  Port, supra  note 64, at 592-93.
70 Nonobviousness prevents patents from issuing when a person with ordinary
skill would have found the invention to be “obvious” when it was made. Id . at 593.
71 To be useful, “an invention need only be operable and capable of performing
some function.” Id . at 592.
72 Mark D. Janis, Sustainable Agriculture, Patent Rights, and Plant Innovation , 9
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 91, 94 (2001).
73 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
74 Aoki, supra  note 42, at 278.
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i. Rationale for the Exclusion of Plants as Patentable Subject
Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Neither plants nor any other biological subject matter are in-
cluded in the express language of § 101.75  As a result of this
omission, until 1980 the view proposed by the Commissioner of
Patents was that plants did not fall under the purview of the pro-
tections afforded under § 101 since they were products of nature
and not inventions.76  Moreover, the written description require-
ment specified in 35 U.S.C. § 112 was seen as an insurmountable
hurdle that precluded the extension of utility patent protection to
plants.77
b. The Plant Patent Act of 1930
In response to the barriers that made the recognition of plants
as patentable subject matter infeasible, as early as the 1880s pri-
vate plant breeders called for the establishment of a system for
patenting plants.78  What the plant breeders finally ended up with
was the Townsend-Purnell Plant Patent Act of 1930 (PPA); the
first of its kind anywhere in the world.79  The congressional intent
75 Id .
76 See  Nicholas J. Seay, Protecting the Seeds of Innovation: Patenting Plants , 16
AIPLA Q.J. 418, 419 (1989) (stating that “[t]his proposition was cited as the holding
by the Commissioner of Patents in Ex parte Latimer[, 1889 Comm’n Dec. 123
(1899),] in 1899, which held that the fiber from the needle of an evergreen tree was
an unpatentable product of nature.”)
77 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).  The statute specifically states that:
[t]he specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and
of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, con-
cise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of
carrying out his invention.
78 A bill supported by the American Breeders Association was introduced in Con-
gress supposedly to accomplish the goal of patenting plants; it never made it past the
committee stage and was eventually abandoned.  “Breeders argued that plants were
akin to machines and as such, innovations in the way that plants ‘worked’ should be
protected in the same way that innovations in machinery were protected through
patent law.” See  Aoki, supra note 42, at 279.  Along the same lines, Thomas Edison,
a proponent of plant patents, testified before Congress that “nothing that Congress
could do to help farming would be of greater value and permanence than to give the
plant breeder the same status as the mechanical and chemical inventors now have
through the law.” See  Roberts, supra  note 68, at 98.
79 Anne E. Crocker, Will Plants Finally Grow into Full Patent Protection on an
International Level?  A Look at the History of U.S. And International Patent Law
Regarding Patent Protection for Plants and the Likely Changes After the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s Decision in J.E.M. AgAG Supply v. Pionner Hi-Bred, 8 DRAKE J.
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behind the Act, which extended patent-like protection to asexu-
ally propagated species,80 was to provide agriculture with incen-
tives and protections for developing new varieties and
innovations similar to those employed in encouraging mechanical
and scientific developments in other industries.81
To qualify for protection under the PPA, the plant breeder is
required to show that the plant created has new and unique char-
acteristics and that the plant can be reproduced through budding,
grafting, or cutting techniques that result in a new plant variety
with the exact same, unique characteristics.82  The variety must
be distinct,83 new,84 and nonobvious.85  It is worth mentioning
that the PPA contains an exemption from compliance with the
“written requirement” of 35 U.S.C. § 112.86  Accordingly, it is be-
cause the policy of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
with judicial backing, to accept the deposit of exact biological
specimens at specified repositories as fulfillment of the § 112 re-
quirement.87  Protection under the PPA lasts for a period of
twenty years and precludes other parties from making, selling, or
AGRIC. L. 251, 257 (2003).  Initially, the PPA was included in the section governing
utility patents but in a redrafting of the U.S. Patent Act of 1952, the Act was moved
to a separate section now codified as 35 U.S.C. § 161. See  Aoki, supra  note 42, at
282 (citing J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pionner Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc. , noting that there
has been considerable ambiguity as to what Congress intended by this move).  Like
utility patents, plant patents are administered by the PTO which is part of the
United States Department of Commerce.
80 These species are those that are vegetatively produced from cuttings or grafts
and not grown from seed.  Peter J. Goss, Guiding the Hand That Feeds:  Toward
Socially Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology Innovation , 84 CAL.
L. REV. 1395, 1406 (1996).  The rationale for the restriction to asexually propagated
plants was the belief that plant varieties could not be reproduced reliably by seed.
Debra L. Blair, Note, Intellectual Property Protection and Its Impact on the U.S. Seed
Industry , 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 297, 310 (1999).
81 Crocker, supra  note 79, at 257.
82 Id .
83 To be distinct the variety must have characteristics that are clearly distinguisha-
ble from those of existing varieties. See  Gustad, supra  note 63, at 464.
84 “New” in this context means that the variety has not previously existed. Id .
85 Nonobvious means that the variety is sufficiently different from previous vari-
eties so as not to be obvious at the time of invention to someone having ordinary
skill in the art. Id .
86 However, the exemption is not absolute since it permits noncompliance only “if
the description is as complete as is reasonably possible.”  Seay, supra  note 76, at 422
(referring to 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1982)).
87 Id .  This seed deposit alternative is significant.  The development of traditional
plant varieties were difficult to record on paper with sufficient detail to satisfy the
“written requirement” yet the same developments could be readily seen with the
naked eye. See  Crocker, supra note 79, at 257.
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reproducing the patented variety.88  Seeking to obtain similar
protection for sexually reproduced plants, the American Seed
Trade Association unsuccessfully lobbied in support of a bill to
amend the PPA.89
c. The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970
In 1970, Congress enacted90 a new form of statutory patent
protection for plants styled as the Plant Variety Protection Act
(PVPA).91  Despite the perceived domestic demand for enlarged
patent protection for plants, the PVPA was enacted in response
to Western European nations forming the Paris Union, also
known as the International Union for the Protection of New Va-
rieties of Plants (UPOV).92  The purpose of the PVPA is “to en-
courage the development of varieties of sexually reproduced
plants and to make them available to the public, providing pro-
tection available to those who breed, develop, or discover them,
and thereby promoting progress in agriculture in the public inter-
88 Seay, supra note 76, at 422.  The PPA has significant limitations; the most im-
portant one is that most agricultural crop plants are reproduced sexually and multi-
plied by seed, thus falling outside the purview of the PPA.  Blair, supra note 80, at
311.  Naturally, the PPA provided little or no incentive for researchers of such crops
to create new varieties.  Crocker, supra note 79, at 258.  Also, the PPA provides
patent protection for only a plant in its entirety and does not permit separate claims
for parts of the plant.  Nicholson, supra  note 62, at 18.
89 Blair, supra note 80, at 311.  By 1967 there was a patent law revision pending in
Congress.  The ASTA proposed broadening the reach of the PPA to cover useful
“sexually” reproducing varieties by adding “or sexually” to all the relevant sections.
However, the USDA, agronomists, farmers, and public plant breeders all opposed
the move and effectively halted it in its tracks.  In spite, and as a result, of this
setback, it became apparent that some type of protection for sexually reproducible
varieties was inevitable.  Between 1967 and 1969, the foundation of new statutory
provisions was laid during negotiations between the ASTA, the USDA, public plant
breeders, and members of Congress.  Aoki, supra note 42, at 284.
90 As constitutional authority in enacting this statute, Congress invoked both
clause 3 (the “commerce clause”) and clause 8 (the “patent clause”) of Article 1,
Section 8.  Crocker, supra note 79, at 259.  This statute is now codified as 7 U.S.C.
§ 2581.
91 Crocker, supra note 79, at 259.  However, “[t]he PVPA itself never refers to the
protection afforded or its character as a ‘patent,’” rather the plant variety is issued a
“Certificate of Plant Variety Protection.”  Seay, supra note 76, at 424.  The PVPA is
administered by the Plant Variety Protection Office (PVPO) of the United States
Department of Agriculture.  Roberts, supra  note 68, at 100.
92 For more on UPOV see the discussion in Part IV.D.  While the United States
did not join UPOV until 1981, Congress enacted the PVPA eleven years earlier so as
to be consistent with UPOV and in the process facilitate patent protection for plant
breeders working at both a domestic and an international level. Crocker, supra note
79, at 259.
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est.”93  Thus, the PVPA provides patent-like protection to plant
breeders whose plant varieties breed true-to-type for several gen-
erations.94  To receive protection under the PVPA, the breeder
must apply for a certificate of protection and show that the plant
is (1) new and distinct, (2) novel, and (3) uniform and stable.95
An application for a certificate is expected to generally provide a
“description that is ‘adequate or as complete as is reasonably
possible.’”96
Anyone violating rights granted under the PVPA may be liable
for infringement.97  Procurement of a certificate affords the
holder a legal right to exclude others from reproducing, selling,
importing, or exporting the protected variety for a period of
twenty years.98  An important feature of the PVPA lies in the
93 Blair, supra note 80, at 312.
94 Crocker, supra note 79, at 259.  Variety in the context of the PVPA refers to the
taxonomic use of the term.  This use means that a variety is a
plant grouping within a single botanical taxon of the lowest rank . . .  de-
fined by the expression of the characteristics resulting from a given geno-
type or combination of genotypes, distinguished from any other plant
grouping by the expression of at least one characteristic and considered as
a unit with regard to the sustainability of the plant grouping for being prop-
agated unchanged.
Elisa Rives, Mother Nature and the Courts:  Are Sexually Reproducing Plants and
Their Progeny Patentable Under the Utility Patent Act of 1952? , 32 CUMB. L. REV.
187, 200-01 (2001-2002).  Protection under the PVPA will be denied unless the vari-
ety generates the same novel and distinct characteristics when reproduced over mul-
tiple generations.  The only variations acceptable are those that are “predictable and
commercially acceptable, and have reasonable stability.” Id .  This requirement
makes the PVPA more difficult to obtain than the PPA, the latter only requiring that
the new variety be new and distinct. See Crocker, supra note 79, at 259.
95 Nicholson, supra  note 62, at 18. For definition of these terms, see 7 U.S.C.
§ 2402(1)-(4) (2002).
96 Roberts, supra  note 68, at 100. The application need not provide a level of
detail necessary to enable other parties to recreate the new variety as mandated by
§ 112; however, an applicant may satisfy § 112 by furnishing a precise description
(by use of a procedural device and deposit of a sample) in a way that permits others
to reproduce the variety without unnecessary experimentation.  However, “neither
the [PVPA] statute nor the applicable regulation mandates that such material be
accessible to the general public during the term of the PVP certificate.” Timothy P.
Daniels, Keep the License Agreements Coming:  The Effect of J.E.M. AgAG Supply,
Incorporated v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Incorporated on Universities’ Use of
Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Their Plant Genetic Research , 2003 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 771, 776 (2003).
97 7 U.S.C. § 2451.
98 Nicholson, supra  note 62, at 19.  Infringement also entails “sexually multiplying
the novel variety, using the novel variety in producing (as distinguished from devel-
oping) a hybrid or different variety, using seed which has been prohibited from
propagation, or distributing the protected variety to another without proper notice.”
Seay, supra note 76, at 424.
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exemptions it contains.  These exemptions include: (1) farmers’
rights to save seeds,99 and (2) researchers’ rights to use protected
plants for further development.100
Between 1970, when the PVPA was enacted, and 1985, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) issued over
2000 PVPA certificates.101  While the PPA and the PVPA pro-
vided much sought after protection for plant breeders and the
seed industry, a gaping hole still remained.102  Advances in ge-
netic engineering allowed scientists to accurately identify vari-
eties that were previously indistinguishable to the naked eye.103
Genetic engineering techniques also permitted the identification
of plant varieties based upon a seed’s genetic composition, mak-
ing it possible to satisfy the written description provision of
§ 101.104  Usually, once identified or analyzed for their genetic
composition, seeds and plants may be utilized in a breeding pro-
gram to create new varieties.105
99 The depiction by the seed industry of the farmers’ right to save seed as a disin-
centive to investment aimed at developing new varieties prompted Congress to
amend the PVPA so as to restrict but not entirely eliminate this exception.  Pres-
ently, a farmer may sell seeds of a protected variety but only that amount of seed
that could have been saved for the farmer’s own replanting purposes.  Nicholson,
supra  note 62, at 20.  The Supreme Court in Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer , 513
U.S. 179 (1995), interpreted the PVPA as permitting the sale of seed saved for pur-
poses of replanting on the farmer’s own acreage with the farmer’s primary farming
occupation being such that the sale of crops for reasons other than reproductive
purposes constitutes the preponderance of the farmer’s business in the protected
seed.  Blair, supra note 80, at 313.
100 Nicholson, supra  note 62, at 19.  The second exemption, the research exemp-
tion, allows others to use protected varieties as “stepping stones to develop new
varieties and advance agricultural biotechnology through research.”  This exemption
was also narrowed by Congress by declaring that a variety which is “essentially de-
rived” from a protected variety would be considered an infringement.  A side effect
of this restriction has been the reduction of the amount of research conducted using
protected varieties based on researchers’ fears of violating the PVPA, a recipe for
inviting costly litigation.  Crocker, supra note 79, at 261.
101 Gustad, supra note 63, at 465.  “One of the main attractions the PVPA holds
for plant breeders is that the breeders themselves can complete the applications for
certificates of protection without the services of a patent attorney,” thus making it
both cost-effective and user-friendly. Id.
102 Blair, supra note 80, at 315.
103 Crocker, supra note 79, at 262.
104 Id .
105 Blair, supra note 80, at 315.
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2. Post-1980 Developments
a. Extension of 35 U.S.C. § 101 Utility Patent Protection to
Plants
The seed industry felt that it needed a form of protection for
inbred lines or hybrids created using two or more inbred lines—a
protection aimed at preventing independent plant breeders or
other seed companies from taking advantage of the plant
breeder/innovator’s research and development efforts.106  Help
came in the form of the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Dia-
mond v. Chakrabarty ,107 which recognized the patentability of
living inventions.  The Court ruled that a bacterium invented by
Chakrabarty that broke down crude oil was patentable subject
matter because: (1) it was a product of human labor which con-
tained characteristics “markedly different” from those found in
nature, and (2) it showed potential for significant utility.108
In spite of the holding in Chakrabarty , whether complex living
organisms, including sexually reproducing “man-made” plants,
were patentable subject matter under the utility patent statute
remained unclear.109  The issue of the patentability of sexually
reproducible plants was addressed in ex parte Hibberd .110  In
Hibberd , the PTO originally rejected a patent application for a
maize plant containing high levels of amino acids by arguing that
the enactment of the PVPA precluded the extension of standard
utility patents for plant matter.111  On review, the United States
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences rejected the exam-
iner’s assertion by noting that the statute did not expressly ex-
106 Id .
107 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
108 Id . at 310.  In so ruling, the Court rejected the patent examiner’s rationale that
these microorganisms were “products of nature” and thus not protected under the
statute. See id . at 306.  The Court noted that patents are available for “a non-
naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter — a product of human
ingenuity ‘having a distinctive name, character [and] use.’” Id . at 309-10.  This deci-
sion was groundbreaking since prior to 1980, the PTO and the federal courts were
reluctant to allow the extension of utility patents to living matter.  Lara E. Ewens,
Seed Wars:  Biotechnology, Intellectual Property, and the Quest for High Yield Seeds ,
23 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 293 (2000).
109 Blair, supra note 80, at 316.
110 227 U.S.P.Q. 443 (1985).
111 Id . at 444.
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clude any plant from being proper subject matter for a utility
patent.112
The legitimacy of Hibberd  was challenged in J.E.M. AG Sup-
ply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, Inc.113  The defendant,
J.E.M., argued that, in light of the PPA and the PVPA, the PTO
incorrectly extended the scope of utility patents because the ex-
tension was accomplished without congressional approval.114
Justice Thomas, writing for the majority, upheld the validity of
the Pioneer Hi-Bred patents and added that J.E.M.’s unautho-
rized resale of patented hybrid corn seeds infringed on those pat-
ents.115  Justice Thomas seemed to say that since the PPA and the
PVPA do not explicitly state that general utility patents cannot
be issued for germplasm, the PTO was free to extend utility pat-
ent protection to asexually or sexually reproduced germplasm.
In Canada, the patentability of genetically engineered “higher”
life forms was addressed in Harvard College v. Canada (Commis-
sioner of Patents) ,116 a 2002 Canadian Supreme Court ruling.
The case involved a patent application seeking to patent the
“oncomouse.”117  In reaching its decision, the court first placed
mammals in the “higher” life form category and then went on to
rule that “higher” life forms would not fit into any of the patenta-
ble subject matter classes.118  The court applied this reasoning
112 Id . at 444-45.  Although Hibberd  “heightened the stakes for inventors and
breeders of transgenically modified plants by stating that such products were eligible
for utility patent protection, the question of whether plants and seeds would ever
actually receive patent protection as proper subject matter under [the utility patent
provisions] was not answered . . . .”  Crocker, supra note 79, at 267.  Nevertheless,
over 1000 plant utility patents have been issued since the Hibberd  decision in 1985.
Id .
113 534 U.S. 124 (2001).  In February 1998, Pioneer Hi-Bred International sued a
small Iowa seed supply company for patent infringement claiming that the defen-
dant infringed on 17 of Pioneer’s patents by purchasing seed from authorized Pio-
neer Hi-Bred dealers and then reselling the seed.
114 Farm Advantage claimed that by explicitly providing for asexually reproduced
plants in the PPA and for sexually reproduced varieties in the PVPA, Congress in-
tended to preclude utility patent prosecution under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Id .
115 Justice Thomas noted that the Court “hold[s] that newly developed plant
breeds fall within the terms of § 101, and that neither the PPA nor the PVPA limits
the scope of § 101’s coverage.  As in Chakrabarty,  [the court declines] to narrow the
reach of § 101 where Congress has given us no indication that it intends this result.”
J.E.M. AG Supply, 534 U.S. at 145-46.
116 [2002] S.C.R. 45.
117 The oncomouse is a mouse that is genetically engineered to be predisposed to
certain cancers and was hailed to be a valuable research tool. Id .
118 Id . at 47.  A “higher life form” cannot be described as an art, process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, the categories of patentable subject matter,
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and proscribed the patenting of plants by classifying such as
“higher” life forms.119  This proscription also applies to animal
life that is “more complex than microbes but less complex than
mammals.”120  With its holding, the Supreme Court of Canada
seemed to reject the far-reaching holding its American peer
reached in Chakrabarty .
Two years later, when deciding Schmeiser v. Monsanto ,121 the
Supreme Court of Canada stated that “living” inventions are pat-
entable as long as they are not expressed as a higher life form
(i.e., plant genes and cells as opposed to the plant as a whole).122
Therefore, in Canada, while a “higher” life form (e.g., a canola
plant) is not eligible for patent protection, a claim to a modified
plant gene or cell is.123  Subsequent to Schmeiser , the Canadian
Patent Office revised its position on the patentability of claims
directed to plant or animal cells.124
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling ,125 a 2004 decision of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court unanimously
found that a farmer infringed a patent by saving and planting
glyphosate-tolerant soybean seed.126  In his defense, McFarling
alleged violations of the PVPA and federal antitrust laws and in-
voked the patent misuse, patent exhaustion, and first sale doc-
trines.127  However, unlike Schmeiser, McFarling did not
challenge the validity of Monsanto’s patents.128  The court re-
because such a life form possesses qualities that transcend its mere genetic makeup.
Id . at 45.
119 Id .  However, it has been noted that the qualities the Court described defining
higher life forms could hardly apply to plants especially in terms of displaying emo-
tion or even responding to stimuli in a complex and unpredictable manner. See
Adrian Zahl, Patenting of “Higher Life Forms” in Canada , 23 BIOTECHNOLOGY L.
REP. 556, 557 (2004).
120 Zahl, supra  note 119, at 557 (noting that the Court appreciated the difficulty in
drawing a line between higher and lower life forms and made a conscious decision
not to do so).
121 See supra  note 5.
122 Id.
123 Zahl, supra note 119, at 558.
124 Before this decision came down, the Canadian Patent Office required claims
to plant or animal cells to be restricted to isolated cells, cell lines, or cells in culture.
The Patent Office currently permits claims to cells as long as the description does
not define “cells” to include plants, animals, or tissue.  ABA Section on Intellectual
Property Law Bulletin Jan. 2005, available at  http://www.abanet. org/intelprop/bulle-
tin/January_2005.doc (last visited Feb. 11, 2005) (on file with author).
125 363 F.3d 1336 (2004).
126 Id . at 1339-40.
127 Id . at 1340.
128 Id .
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jected McFarling’s patent misuse argument, which claimed that
by prohibiting seed-saving Monsanto had extended its patent on
gene technology to include the germplasm—a product that can-
not be patented.129  Citing J.E.M. AG Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l Inc. ,130 the court also declined McFarling’s invitation
to reconsider an earlier ruling that the PVPA “does not demon-
strate a congressional intent to preempt or invalidate all prohibi-
tions on seed saving contained in utility-patent licenses.”131
B. The 1983 International Undertaking on Plant
Genetic Resources
The FAO became a flashpoint for debates between the coun-
tries of the North and the South regarding exploitation of PGR.
Over the objections of the United States, the FAO adopted the
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (IUPGR)
in 1983 and also established an FAO Commission on Plant Ge-
netic Resources (CPGR).132  The IUPGR and the CPGR were
spearheaded by a group of developing countries and were sup-
ported by an array of NGOs allied with the International Coali-
tion for Development Action.133
The IUPGR was a nonbinding agreement that set out rules
and standards for exchanging and conserving seeds and plant tis-
sues. Importantly, the IUPGR took the position that PGR were
129 Id . at 1341-43.
130 See supra  note 113.
131 McFarling , 363 F.3d at 1344.
132 U.N.F.A.O. Res. 8/83, U.N.F.A.O., 22d Session, Nov. 5-23, 1983.
At the 1981 FAO biennial conference, a resolution was adopted, against
the vehement opposition of developed countries (especially the United
States, United Kingdom and Australia) and the seed industry, calling for
the drafting of a legal convention.  In 1983, the over-ambitious demand for
a convention was replaced by a call for a non-binding undertaking, and for
the creation of a new FAO Commission on Plant Genetic Resources
(CPGR) where governments could meet for discussion and monitor what
became known as the International Undertaking on Plant Genetic
Resources.
Graham Dutfield, TRIPS-Related Aspects of Traditional Knowledge , 33 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 233, 265 (2001).
133 NGOs such as the International Coalition for Development Action were more
knowledgeable on the outstanding issues than were most of the delegates from the
developing world.  Thus, the delegates viewed these NGOs as resources that they
could consult for analysis and information.  Also, the NGOs played the important
role of bridging the gap between Latin American delegates and their counterparts
from Africa and Asia. See FOWLER, supra  note 10, at 187. R
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to be considered the “common heritage of mankind.”134  Why
would this be controversial given the fact that developed coun-
tries justified their access to and use of the genetic resources
from developing countries of the South on just that basis?  What
made the IUPGR’s “common heritage” principle so controver-
sial was its extremely broad definition of PGR subject to the un-
dertaking; commercial plant varieties protected by breeders’
rights and plant patents were to be treated in the same way as
traditional landraces and wild plants –- as “common heritage.”
Therefore, these commercial plant varieties would be freely ac-
cessible to farmers and breeders around the world.135
C. The Keystone Dialogues and “Farmers’ Rights”
Countries such as the United States flatly refused to partici-
pate in the IUPGR, resulting in a stalemate until 1989, when the
developing and developed countries were able to reach prelimi-
nary agreement on three principles related to PGR.  The Key-
stone Dialogues first came to the consensus that plants protected
by plant variety protection rights would not be considered freely
accessible—a recognition of valid intellectual property rights in
plant varieties.136  Second, the parties agreed that common heri-
tage or free accessibility to farmers’ landraces and wild and
weedy relatives did not mean access free of charge, i.e., that it
might be possible to design an arrangement where plant breeders
could be obligated to pay for plant tissue and seeds collected in a
134 The principle of “common heritage” is embodied in the “International Under-
taking on Plant Genetic Resources” of the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food
and Agriculture, U.N. Food & Agriculture Organization, 22d Sess., Annex, Res. 8/
83, available at  ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/Res/C8-83E.pdf (last visited Mar. 3,
2005) [hereinafter IUPGR]  (“Recognizing that (a) plant genetic resources  are a her-
itage of mankind  to be preserved, and to be freely available for use, for the benefit of
present and future generations .”) (emphasis in original).
135 It is no surprise that such an arrangement was unacceptable to industrial na-
tions, especially those with established private seed industries.  These nations viewed
the undertaking was as a veiled attempt at undermining the principle of private
property. They had good reason for concern since the undertaking literally sought to
decommodify commercial plant varieties. KLOPPENBURG, supra  note 11, at 174. See
also  Jim Chen, Webs of Life:  Conservation as a Species of Information Policy , 89
IOWA L. REV. 495, 583 (2004) (In adopting the undertaking the “Food and Agricul-
ture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) provides one example of an ap-
proach repudiating private property.”).
136 THE KEYSTONE CENTER, FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE KEYSTONE IN-
TERNATIONAL DIALOGUE SERIES ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES:  MADRAS PLE-
NARY SESSION (1990).
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particular country’s territory.137  Finally, the parties adverted to a
vague idea of farmers’ rights.138  These rights were undefined,
but the FAO referred to some sort of recognition for the
thousands of years of farmers’ efforts spent in domesticating cur-
rent agricultural staple crops and varieties.139
Farmers’ rights was an idea that was proposed by a Canadian
NGO, the Rural Advancement Foundation International
(RAFI), in 1985 that was meant to embody concerns over genetic
erosion and the North-South “gene drain.”140  As envisaged by
RAFI, farmers’ rights were a new type of collective intellectual
property rights, meant to counter plant breeders’ rights.  Farm-
ers’ rights theoretically would allow farmers to receive compen-
sation from an international genetic conservation fund to be
administered by the FAO.141
137 See  Kirit K. Patel, Farmers’ Rights Over Plant Genetic Resources in the South:
Challenges and Opportunities , in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AGRICUL-
TURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 97 (F.H. Erbisch & K.M. Maredia eds., 2d ed. 2004).
138 FOWLER, supra  note 10, at 199 (“[I]mportant ground was broken in two ar- R
eas—in defining the notion of genetic resources as ‘common heritage’ and in the
emerging concept of ‘farmers’ rights.’”).
139 FAO Resolution (5/89): Farmers’ rights are
[R]ights arising from the past, present and future contributions of farmers
in conserving, improving and making available plant genetic resources, par-
ticularly those in centres of origin/diversity.  These rights are vested in the
international community, as trustee for present and future generations of
farmers, for the purpose of ensuring full benefits to farmers, and support-
ing the continuation of their contributions.
Carol B. Thompson, International Law of the Sea/Seed: Public Domain Versus Pri-
vate Commodity , 44 NAT. RESOURCES J. 841, 866 n.94 (2004).  While the FAO for-
mulated the concept of farmers’ rights, these rights were not defined in a legal sense
because the term was considered political. Id .
140 See  Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments:  The Tension Between Commer-
cial and Social Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property , 14 FLA. J. INT’L L.
193, 216 n.50 (2002).
141 Larry Helfer defines farmers’ rights as:
a loosely defined concept that seeks to acknowledge the contributions that
traditional farmers have made to the preservation and improvement of
[plant genetic resources]. Unlike other natural resources such as coal and
oil, [plant genetic resources] are maintained and managed by humans, who
cultivate the wild plant varieties that serve as raw materials for future inno-
vations by plant breeders.  But whereas breeders obtain proprietary rights
in new varieties to compensate them for the time and expense of innova-
tion, no system of remuneration rewards farmers. Farmers’ rights thus act
as a counterweight to plant breeders’ rights, compensating the upstream
input providers who make downstream innovations possible.
Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting:  The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of
International Intellectual Property Lawmaking , 29 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 37 (2004).
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Farmers’ rights advocates focused on the following four issues:
(1) the right to grow, improve, and market local varieties and
their products; (2) the right to access improved plant varieties
and use farm-saved seeds of commercial varieties for planting
and exchange; (3) the right to be compensated for the use of lo-
cal varieties in the development of new commercial products by
outsiders; and (4) the right to participate in decision-making
processes related to acquiring, improving, and using PGR.142
In 1989, the FAO adopted a new interpretation of the 1983
IUPGR that declared that plant breeders’ rights were compatible
with common heritage and also recognized the principle of farm-
ers’ rights, i.e., that most of the world’s valuable germplasm came
from the developing world and was the result of thousands of
years of selection by farmers, and that some form of compensa-
tion should be paid for use of that germplasm.143  However,
neither the international fund nor farmers’ rights crystallized in
the period following 1989, in large part because contributing to
the fund was voluntary.
D. The International Union for the Protection of New
Varieties of Plants (1960, 1978, and 1991)
 In 1960, a group of European nations met to create UPOV,
which was designed to create a legal basis for plant breeders’
rights  in privately-bred varieties of plants.144  The UPOV protec-
142 PATEL, supra  note 137, at 96.
143 Annie Patricia Kameri-Mbote & Philippe Cullet, The Management of Genetic
Resources:  Developments in the 1997 Sessions of the Commission on Genetic Re-
sources for Food and Agriculture , 1997 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 78, 83-84
(1997).
144 UPOV is the French acronym for Union Internationale pour la Protection des
Obtentions Végétales. International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of
Plants, Dec. 16, 1961, 33 U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89.  For a discussion on the first
plant breeders’ protection systems in Europe, the conflicts between industry and
plant breeders, the adoption of UPOV, and the introduction of plant breeders’ rights
in the United States, see PISTORIUS & VAN WIJK, supra  note 43, at 79-85.  The
UPOV has been amended several times since 1961 when the original convention was
finalized.  These amendments include those of 1972, 1978, and 1991.  Currently, dif-
ferent countries apply different versions of the UPOV convention as provided by the
amendments.  Steven M. Ruby, Note, The UPOV System of Protection:  How to
Bridge the Gap Between 1961 and 1991 in Regard to Breeders’ Rights , 2 OKLA. J.L.
& TECH 19, 19 (2004).  For a list of the 58 member nations (as of November 2004)
and the respective versions of UPOV the member nations currently apply, see States
Party to the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants,
available at  http:// www.upov.int/en/about/members/index.htm (last visited Jan. 20,
2004).
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tions went farther than the PPA, which protected only asexually
reproduced plants.145  UPOV protected all varieties of plants, in-
cluding sexually reproduced varieties, as long as they were (1)
new,146 (2) distinct,147 (3) uniform,148 and (4) stable.149  The
United States passed its own form of plant variety protection in
1970150—at the height of the Green Revolution.151  These pieces
of legislation were indications that plant breeding in North
America and Europe was becoming increasingly dominated by
private plant breeders.
Under the 1978 UPOV, local varieties grown by farmers were
considered open access because they lacked the uniformity, and
stability required for protection.  The 1978 UPOV, however, did
have a “farmers’ exemption,” which allowed any farmer who
purchased seeds of a protected variety to save seeds from those
crops for subsequent replanting without paying additional royal-
ties.152  The seed industry lobbied heavily to many governments
145 See supra  Part IV.A.1.b.
146 A variety is deemed new if “at the date of filing of the application for a
breeder’s right, propagating or harvesting material of the variety has not been sold
or otherwise disposed of to others, by or with the consent of the breeder, for pur-
poses of exploitation of the variety.”  1991 UPOV Convention, ch. 3, art. 6(1).
147 A variety is distinct
if it is clearly distinguishable from any other variety whose existence is a
matter of common knowledge at the time of the filing of the applica-
tion. . . . [T]he filing of an application for the granting of a breeder’s right
or for the entering of another variety in an official register of varieties, in
any country, shall be deemed to render that other variety a matter of com-
mon knowledge from the date of the application, provided that the applica-
tion leads to the granting of a breeder’s right or to the entering of the said
variety in the official register of varieties . . . .
1991 UPOV Convention, ch. 3, art. 7.
148 A variety is uniform if “subject to the variation that may be expected from the
particular features of its propagation, it is sufficiently uniform in its relevant charac-
teristics.”  1991 UPOV Convention, ch. 3, art. 8.
149 To be stable, a variety’s relevant characteristics must remain unchanged after
repeated propagation or in case of a cycle of propagation, at the end of that cycle.
1991 UPOV Convention, ch. 3 art. 9.
150 See supra  Part IV.A.1.c.
151 See supra  Part III.
152 The so-called “farmers’ exemption” in the 1978 UPOV is implicit.  The actual
language of the 1978 UPOV art. 5(1) states that:  “The effect of the right granted to
the breeder is that his prior authorization shall be required for [(i)] the production
for purposes of commercial marketing, [(ii)] the offering for sale, [and (iii)] market-
ing of the reproductive or vegetative propagating material, as such, of the variety.”
Thus the 1978 UPOV, in limiting the rights of plant breeders to only prevent the
commercial exploitation of their varieties, indirectly extended to farmers the right to
save seed for their own personal (i.e., non-commercial) purposes.
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to limit the 1978 UPOV farmers’ exemption.153  Then, in the 1991
UPOV, farmers’ rights were curtailed as follows: (1) article 15(2)
makes farmers’ rights optional and allows each UPOV member
nation to decide whether or not to extend such rights;154 (2) plant
breeders’ exemptions are narrowed in articles 14 and 15(1)—“es-
sentially derived” varieties cannot be marketed without permis-
sion from the original plant breeders;155 and (3) unlike the 1978
UPOV, which did not allow member nations to grant utility pat-
153 The global seed and biotechnology industries still continue to pressure devel-
oping countries to adopt the 1991 version of UPOV with its stronger monopoly
rights and watered-down farmers’ exemption.  Nadine Barron & Ed Couzens, Intel-
lectual Property Rights and Plant Variety Protection in South Africa:  An Interna-
tional Perspective , 16 J. ENVTL. L. 19, 36 (2004).
154 The farmer’s exemption is contained in the 1991 UPOV Convention ch. 5, art.
15, which reads as follows:
(2) [Optional exception] Notwithstanding Article 14, each Contracting
Party may, within reasonable limits and subject to the safeguarding of the
legitimate interests of the breeder, restrict the breeders’ right in relation to
any variety in order to permit farmers to use for propagating purposes, on
their own holdings, the product of the harvest which they have obtained by
planting, on their own holdings, the protected variety or a variety covered
by Article 14(5)(a)(i) or (ii).
155 Ch. 4, art. 14 reads as follows:
(5) [essentially derived and certain other varieties]  (a)  The provisions of
paragraphs (1) to (4) shall also apply in relation to (i) varieties which are
essentially derived from the protected variety, where the protected variety
is not itself an essentially derived variety, (ii) varieties which are not clearly
distinguishable in accordance with Article 7 from the protected variety and
(iii) varieties whose production requires the repeated use of the protected
variety.
While the UPOV protects plant breeder’s rights over “essentially derived” varieties,
the convention itself fails to define what “essentially derived” may entail.  It there-
fore leaves this interpretation to domestic legislation, judicial interpretation, or to
private parties in the midst of contractual negotiations.
The convention itself defines essentially derived varieties as “predomi-
nantly derived . . . while retaining the expression of essential characteris-
tics,” “clearly distinguishable,” or “conforming to the initial variety in the
expression of the essential characteristics that result from the genotype or
combination of genotypes in the variety.”  These definitions rely on an un-
derstanding of the phrases “essential characteristics” and “clearly distin-
guishable.”  As discussed . . . because these phrases are left to UPOV
signatory states, various meanings may evolve.
Mark Hanning, An Examination of the Possibility to Secure Intellectual Property
Rights for Plant Genetic Resources Developed by Indigenous People of NAFTA
States:  Domestic Legislation Under the International Convention for Protection of
New Plant Varieties , 13 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 241-42 (1996) (footnotes
omitted).
\\server05\productn\O\OEL\19-2\OEL204.txt unknown Seq: 37  2-MAY-05 12:33
Malthus, Mendel, and Monsanto 433
ents for sexually reproduced varieties, article 35(2) of the 1991
UPOV seemed to do just the opposite.156
The effect of TRIPS on the ability of developing countries to
enter into UPOV remains to be seen.  Arguably, developing
countries may accede to the 1978 version of UPOV (which allows
farmer seed saving) and stay out of the 1991 agreement; how-
ever, this is only possible if countries like the United States are
content to allow 1978 levels of protection for protected varieties,
which is doubtful.
E. Convention on Biological Diversity (1992)
The ongoing debate over PGR must be understood in the con-
text of two multilateral agreements.  The first is the CBD, which
was adopted at the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.157  The second
is TRIPS, part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
which was finalized in 1992 in Marrakech, Morocco.158
The CBD was aimed at conserving biodiversity, but has direct
implications on the issue of intellectual property rights in PGR.
The CBD was a multilateral agreement resulting from a process
156 Article 35 of the 1991 UPOV states:
(2) [optionaloptionalOptional exception] (a) Notwithstanding the provi-
sions of Article 3(1), any State which, at the time of becoming party to this
Convention, is a party to the Act of 1978 and which, as far as varieties
reproduced asexually are concerned, provides for protection by an indus-
trial property title other than a breeder’s right shall have the right to con-
tinue to do so without applying this Convention to those varieties.
One commentator noted that the 1991 Act aided plant breeders in that it removed
“the prohibition against double protection of varieties, found in Article 2, which had
prevented UPOV members from offering both breeders’ rights protection and pat-
ents for plant varieties.  The United States had previously been exempted from the
ban on double protection, but its removal creates the opportunity for the rapid ex-
pansion of both forms of protection in other countries, especially some in Europe.
Under the present European Patent Convention, a specific prohibition for patenting
was created for ‘plant or animal varieties or essentially biological processes for the
production of plants or animals; this provision does not apply to microbiological
processes or the products thereof.’  While the provision appears to prevent all pat-
enting of plants, it has been interpreted as applying only to varieties per se.  As a
result, the European Patent Office now examines and grants utility patents on plants
when the claims are not directed at a variety.”  Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns Din-
ner:  Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources , 28
TULSA L.J. 587, 606-07 (1993) (footnotes omitted).
157 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention
on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1730 U.N.T.S. 79, 31 I.L.M. 818 [hereinafter
CBD].
158 TRIPS, supra  note 54.
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that arose out of environmental concerns in the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development member countries.159
The CBD took the position that economic incentives are neces-
sary in order for developing countries to conserve their biodiver-
sity rather than seek quick gains through activities, such as
deforestation, that result in the destruction of biodiversity.160
While the CBD did not focus on PGR for food and agriculture, it
addressed general concerns relating to the conservation of all
plants and other organisms in the global ecology.  Many of the
same divides and controversies that surfaced in the FAO debates
over the IUPGR also surfaced in the CBD negotiations.  Some of
these concerns were: (1) the North-South divide over distribution
of the benefits of biological organisms; (2) the propriety of grant-
ing intellectual property rights over living organisms; and (3)
technology transfer questions regarding access to technologies
necessary to utilize the benefits of such biological organisms.161
159 For background on this convention, see Amanda Hubbard, Comment, The
Convention on Biological Diversity’s Fifth Anniversary:  A General Overview of the
Convention –- Where Has It Been and Where is It Going? , 10 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 415
(1997).
160 Under the terms of the CBD, in which developing countries, rich in biodivers-
ity, agreed to conserve their biodiversity in return for financial aid and royalties
from companies that exploit the same, there was an incentive for developing nations
to safeguard these resources and in the process protect against short-term ventures
whose consequences are likely to include rapid deforestation and subsequent species
destruction.  However, many activists favored a stronger legal framework to protect
genetic diversity in the CBD, which they viewed as far from perfect, it nevertheless
provided a framework on which to build.  Ranee K. L. Panjabi, Idealism and Self-
Interest in International Environmental Law:  The Rio Dilemma , 23 CAL. W. INT’L
L.J. 177, 191 (1992).  The CBD obligates developing biodiversity-rich countries to
conserve, sustainably use, and guarantee access to genetic resources, in return for a
fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of these resources.
 Charles R. McManis, The Interface Between International Intellectual Property and
Environmental Protection:  Biodiversity and Biotechnology , 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 255,
260 (1998).  The creation of a system of financial aid and royalty payments was insti-
tuted based on the realization that most developing nations would be unable to pay
for the measures called for in the CBD without adequate compensation.  An ele-
ment of historical justice has also been proposed with the premise that while the
developed world industrialized and subsequently ensured higher standards of living
for its citizenry that the same developments led to the destruction of biodiversity in
the developing world.  Catherine J. Tinker, Introduction to Biological Diversity:
Law, Institutions and Science , 1 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 1, 21 (1994).
161 On a related note, the United States refusal to ratify the CBD came as no
surprise to many.  The United States repeatedly voiced substantive objections in the
areas of the CBD.  First, the United States took issue with the CBD’s requirement
that developed countries fund environmentally conscious development in develop-
ing countries.  The United States specifically was uncomfortable with what it per-
ceived as the lack of definite restrictions on the amount of funds developed nations
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The CBD differed in one key respect from the IUPGR in that
the CBD acknowledged that many nations had already granted
intellectual property protection of biotechnological inventions.
Additionally, and contrary to the IUPGR, the CBD did not take
a “common heritage” approach to biological resources but ap-
plied the notion that countries of origin  of biological resources
exercised sovereignty over plants, animals, and microorganisms
within their national boundaries.162  With PGR characterized as a
species of sovereign national property,163 the CBD posited that
this sovereign property was a basis for informed consent (prior to
extraction/exploitation) and benefit sharing.164
could be forced to contribute to developing nations.  Second, the CBD called for
essentially open technology transfer including the transfer of biotechnology.  This
aspect of the CBD was seen as endangering intellectual property rights since the
treaty mandated transfer of not only publicly owned but also privately owned tech-
nology.  This reading, it was argued, was apparent when the technology transfer pro-
visions of the CBD were analyzed in context with other provisions serving as a
backdrop which led to the conclusion that the treaty was disregarding patents and
other intellectual property rights.  Finally, that the CBD called for regulatory mea-
sures that applied only to biotechnology as opposed to other environmentally harm-
ful and diversity-depleting activities was unacceptable for the United States.  George
Van Cleve, Regulating Environmental and Safety Hazards of Agricultural Biotech-
nology for a Sustainable World , 9 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 245, 252 n.16 (2002).
While these arguments were articulated by the Bush Administration (1988-92), these
same concerns were repeatedly expressed by large and influential U.S. corporations
that the ratification of the CBD would be adverse to American interests. However,
the United States later became a signatory under the Clinton Administration.  David
B. Vogt, Protecting Indigenous Knowledge in Latin America , 3 OR. REV. INT’L L. 12,
19 n.57 (2001).
162 The CBD treats genetic resources as “tradable commodities subject to national
sovereignty rights” and whose transfer from the developing to the developed world
was envisioned to entail a transfer of technology among other benefits.  Dutfield,
supra  note 132, at 260. Compare  IUPGR approach discussed supra  note 134.
163 CBD, supra  note 157, at art. 3 states that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibil-
ity to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction.
31 I.L.M. 818, *824.
164 CBD art. 15(5) (requiring prior informed consent of the party ‘owning’ the
natural resource); art. 8(j) (equitable sharing of benefits).  Additionally, the CBD
recognized the rights of subnational groups, such as indigenous and local communi-
ties to participate in “benefit sharing.”  For more on traditional resource knowledge
and resources, and indigenous heritage, see DARRELL A. POSEY & GRAHAM
DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY (2000);
INDIGENOUS HERITAGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Silke von Lewinski ed.
2004)
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F. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (1994)
In 1986, the initial focus of the Uruguay Round, and specifi-
cally TRIPS, was an attempt by industrialized nations to secure
multilateral protection for new technologies, pharmaceuticals,
and copyrighted media works against unauthorized imitation or
duplication.165  However, by 1990, intellectual property protec-
tion for biological organisms (including plants) had emerged as a
major negotiating point, just as several newly patented biotech
inventions began making their way to the market.166  Addition-
ally, the phenomenal spate of mergers and acquisitions in the
chemical and pharmaceutical economic sectors that began in the
1970s continued with these companies swiftly moving into the ar-
eas of GE plants, plant breeding, and crop development.167
165 See supra  note 54; Andrew T. Guzman, International Antitrust and the WTO:
The Lesson from Intellectual Property , 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 933, 950 (2003) (“[T]he
agreement seeks to prevent developing countries from allowing what in developed
countries would be viewed as violations of intellectual property rights . . . .”).
166 In fact, there were differences among the various states as to how to deal with
intellectual property with respect to genetically engineered products.  These discus-
sions formed part of the negotiations that led to the 1994 Uruguay Round agree-
ments on trade.  Interestingly however, the language that emerged from these
negotiations failed to address the treatment of genetically engineered products inev-
itably leaving many questions unanswered. See  Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology and
International Law , 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 67-68 (2001).
167 Jack R. Kloppenburg & Daniel L. Kleinman, Preface, Plant Genetic Resources:
The Common Bowl , in SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY:  THE USE AND CONTROL OF
PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 1, 9 (Jack Kloppenburg ed. 1988).  More recently, ac-
cording to the NGO RAFI (now known as ETC),
[t]he first half of 1998 witnessed a dramatic consolidation of power over
plant genetics worldwide, punctuating a trend that began over three de-
cades ago.  The global seed trade is now dominated by life industry giants
whose vast economic power and control over plant germplasm has effec-
tively marginalized the role of public sector plant breeding and research.
Seed Industry Consolidation: Who Controls Whom? , RAFI Communique, July 30,
1998, available at  http://www.etcgroup.org/article.asp?newsid=186 (last visited Jan.
28, 2005).  Other observers note that U.S. regulatory changes served as a catalyst in
the recent spate of mergers resulting in corporate realignment.  However, this trend
is not unique to the United States as there have been massive mergers within the
chemical and “life sciences” and industries.  For example, Novratis AG is one of the
largest pharmaceutical companies and a global leader in crop protection chemicals.
Novratis was the result of a $27 billion merger between two Swiss corporations,
Ciba-Geigy SA and Sandoz Ltd. in 1996.  The consummation of this merger had the
effect of increasing the stakes in the biotechnology industry leading to a spate of
mergers between large multinationals and smaller biotechnology companies. Strate-
gic alliances between large multinationals and small biotechnology firms have also
been popular arrangements.  Stevan Pepa, Research and Trade In Genetics:  How
Countries Should Structure for the Future , 17 MED. & L. 437, 441 (1998).
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Companies also aggressively acted to secure some form of global
intellectual property protection for their biotech innovations.168
However, these claims for more expansive intellectual property
protection were met with opposition from some developing
countries opposed to strengthening international patent law;
these countries advocated for the exclusion from patent of plant
or animal varieties if required on particular public interest
grounds.169
TRIPS was signed by 125 countries in 1994; it mandates that
PGR be accorded either plant variety protection, patent, or ef-
fective protection under a sui generis  system.170  What this meant
168 See generally  Debora Halbert, Intellectual Property in the Year 2025 , 49 J. COP-
YRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 225, 242 (2001).  Halbert says that:
Intellectual property law is the key component of the globalized world, al-
lowing for corporations to enforce their property rights internationally.
The ability of corporations to enforce their intellectual property rights was
codified into international law.  TRIPS, the international trade agreement
which had helped globalize intellectual property regimes, was the product
of a lobbying effort by twelve American multinational corporations.  By
successfully equating intellectual property rights with trade these compa-
nies ensured they would remain firmly entrenched as players in the global
future.
Id .  (footnote omitted).
169 TRIPS, supra  note 54, at art. 27(2).
2. Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary
to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, pro-
vided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is
prohibited by domestic law.  3. Members may also exclude from patentabil-
ity:  (a) diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for the treatment of
humans or animals;  (b) plants and animals other than microorganisms, and
essentially biological processes for the production of plants or animals
other than non-biological and microbiological processes. However, Mem-
bers shall provide for the protection of plant varieties either by patents or
by an effective sui generis  system or by any combination thereof. The pro-
visions of this sub-paragraph shall be reviewed four years after the entry
into force of the Agreement Establishing the MTO.  33 I.L.M. 81, *94
Id. art. 27(2)-(3). See  Susan H. Bragdon and D.R. Downes, Recent Policy Trends
and Developments Related to the Conservation, Use and Development of Genetic Re-
sources: Issues in Genetic Resources, IPGRI Paper No. 7, International Plant Ge-
netic Research Institute, IPGRI (Rome 1998).
170 While the UPOV regime, on which the European plant variety protection
(PVP) measures are based, seems to many to be an effective sui generis  system, it
does fall short.
To meet the TRIPS standard, all species would have to be eligible for pro-
tection, and the rights guaranteed under law in one nation would have to
extend not just to other members of UPOV, but to all countries under the
World Trade Organization.  The general UPOV approach, nevertheless, is
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was that many of the gains made by the developing world at the
1992 Earth Summit were weakened by TRIPS.171
It is useful to compare the different fora: the United Nations-
sponsored IUPGR and 1992 Earth Summit (which produced the
CBD), the intellectual property-forum UPOV, the CGIAR sys-
tem (funded by the industrialized world), and the trade forum
certainly what parties to the TRIPS agreement had in mind for an accept-
able sui generis  alternative to patents.  However, UPOV does not provide
for protection of traditional farmer-varieties of crops, and thus cannot sub-
stantially help meet the goals of the Convention on Biological Diversity to
ensure the conservation, sustainable utilization and fair and equitable shar-
ing of benefits arising from the use of biological diversity.
Cary Fowler, By Policy or Law?  The Challenge of Determining the Status and Future
of Agro-Biodiversity , 3 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 36-37 (1997).  In the United States,
plant variety protection is provided by several means.  Utility patent protection is
geared towards biotechnological inventions, plant patent protection targets new and
distinct asexually reproducible plant varieties, and sui generic  protection (plant vari-
ety protection) is aimed at sexually reproduced plant varieties.  McManis, supra
note 160, at 276.  The Supreme Court has previously ruled that both measures, i.e.,
utility patents and plant variety protection measures, do coexist.  For a discussion on
the options for sui generis  protection, see GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY 78-80 (2000).
171 TRIPS had been construed as providing not only for international recognition,
but also for the enforceability of private patents for microorganisms and even life
itself.  It should therefore come as no surprise that it has been railed at as legitimiz-
ing the piracy of indigenous biodiversity-related knowledge of local communities of
developing nations. See  Shalini Bhutani & Ashish Kothari, The Biodiversity Rights
of Developing Nations: A Perspective From India , 32 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 587,
591 (2002).  One view of the split between rich and poor nations has been character-
ized as “arrogant, cash-rich, resource-poor northern nations attempting to solidify
their economic position at the expense of naive, cash-poor, resource-rich southern
nations.”  This rift was supposedly mended with the signing of the CBD, but the
United States’ refusal to join in the final agreement caused concern in the South.
India, acting on behalf of the developing nations, squared off against the developed
nations at a WTO meeting to plan the final agenda for the next meeting to be held in
Seattle.  The two sides were unable to reach a consensus on any of the outstanding
issues, including the reconciliation of the TRIPS agreement with the CBD.  As a
result, many of the developing nations traveled to the WTO meeting in Seattle ready
to disavow their previous TRIPS commitments and in the process force a renegoti-
ation of the entire TRIPS agreement.  Scott Holwick, Developing Nations and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights , 1999 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 49, 53-54 (2000). See generally  Evelyn Su, Comment, The
Winners and the Losers:  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights and Its Effects on Developing Countries , 23 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 169
(2000) (providing analysis of the TRIPS Agreement and its implications for devel-
oped and developing nations); Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries
Under the TRIPS Agreement , 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 735 (1996) (analyzing the
relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and developing nations).
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.172  The 1989 and 1991
changes in the IUPGR (which ultimately became the 2004 Inter-
national Treaty for Plant Genetic Resources) benefited the de-
veloping world, whereas the 1991 revisions to UPOV
strengthened the position of private plant breeders.173  The CBD
represented some important gains for the developing world: (1)
recognition of the national sovereignty principle174 and (2) oblig-
ing corporations that use developing countries’ seed germplasm
to pay royalties and transfer technology to the host countries.175
Additionally, under article 19 of the CBD, developing countries
are given priority access to biotech products developed from
their germplasm.176  The CBD also links intellectual property
172 Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Re-
sources , available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=441463 (last
visited March 9, 2005); Helfer, supra  note 141.
173 The ITPGR goes beyond recognizing farmers’ rights; one of its main aims is to
facilitate the exchange of seeds and other plant materials for research, breeding, and
crop development purposes.  It seeks to accomplish this exchange by creating a mul-
tilateral system to which member states and their nationals will be granted “facili-
tated access.”  Helfer, supra  note 141, at 40.  In contrast, the UPOV aims at
protecting breeders’ rights and creates an obligation for the respective signatory
states to enact legislation to further that goal.  In effect, UPOV sought to harmonize
property rights associated with the creation or selective breeding of plant varieties.
Eric B. Bluemel, Substance Without Process:  Analyzing TRIPS Participatory Guar-
antees in Light of Protected Indigenous Rights , 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC’Y 671, 695-96 (2004).
174 TRIPS, supra  note 157.
175 The CBD language is framed in terms of an “equitable sharing” of the benefits
resulting from the exploitation of traditional knowledge between developed and de-
veloping nations.  The convention further promotes broader participation in scien-
tific research, the exchange of information amongst the various member signatory
states, the facilitation of both public and private sector technology transfer, and the
equitable sharing of the results of the scientific research and the benefits of genetic
resource commercialization.  Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between In-
tellectual Property Rights and the Need of Less-Developed Countries for Access to
Pharmaceuticals:  Creating a Legal Duty to Supply Under a Theory of Progressive
Global Constitutionalism , 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 755, 925 (1996).  Therefore,
the CBD then creates a legal basis for the developed signatory states to bargain with
the developing signatories should they require access to traditional knowledge for
commercial development.  Royalties or other remuneration paid to the state were
envisioned as the results of such a bargaining process.  These financial considera-
tions are then in turn distributed to the community as proceeds arising from com-
monly-held traditional knowledge to the community.  Shubha Ghosh, Traditional
Knowledge, Patents and the New Mercantilism (Part II) , 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 885, 921 (2003).
176 See  CBD, supra  note 159, at art. 19(2).
Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to promote and
advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting Parties,
especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from bio-
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rights to the distribution of benefits of biotechnology; stating that
intellectual property rights should not run counter to the objec-
tives of the CBD, one of which is “the fair and equitable sharing
of the benefits of genetic resources.”177
G. International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources (2004)178
Although the FAO’s 1983 IUPGR was non-binding, farmers’
rights were recognized in an FAO resolution in 1989 that pro-
posed “establishing a mandatory international fund to support
conservation and utilization of [PGR] through various [pro-
grams] particularly, but not exclusively, in the Third World.”179
This fund was implemented in the 1990s, and as a result, the FAO
decided to institute farmers’ rights through a Global Plan of Ac-
tion adopted at Leipzig in 1996.180  However, the Global Plan of
Action similarly lacked sufficient funding.181
technologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting
Parties.  Such access shall be on mutually agreed terms.
Id .
177 Id . at art. 1.
178 ITPGR, supra  note 19.
179 Patel, supra  note 137, at 97 (citing The Keystone Center, supra  note 136).  It is
worth noting that as applied to plant genetic resources, the IUPGR was viewed as
conflicting with the UPOV, which favored plant breeders’ rights, when it came to
cultivated plant varieties.  However, proponent states lobbied successfully for a revi-
sion of the IUPGR, stating that plant breeders’ rights were “not incompatible” with
the principles underlying the IUPGR.  This reconciliation had the effect of permit-
ting unrestricted access to unimproved plant genetic resources without the benefit of
compensation to the states, communities, or institutions that maintained them.  To
address this imbalance, the developing states proposed that the revised IUPGR vest
farmers’ rights in the international community as trustees.  A vital component of this
arrangement was the creation of an international fund to support conservation.
However, FAO members failed to contribute in any meaningful way causing the
fund to languish during the 1980s and 1990s.  Helfer, supra  note 141, at 36-37.
180 See  David S. Tilford, Saving the Blueprints:  The International Legal Regime
for Plant Resources , 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 373, 426-27 (1998).  Creation of an
international fund in support of farmers’ rights was a controversial proposition at
the FAO-sponsored Fourth Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources held
in Leipzig, Germany in June 1996.  Prior to the conference, 154 governments submit-
ted country reports to FAO.  These reports assessing the status of plant genetic re-
source conservation within their respective jurisdictions served as the basis for the
FAO Report on the State of the World’s Plant Genetic Resources.  Drawing on this
report, delegates from 150 countries converged in Leipzig and agreed upon the
Global Plan of Action (GPA).
181 ITPGR article 14 expressly acknowledges the Global Plan of Action:
Recognizing that the rolling Global Plan of Action for the Conservation
and Sustainable Use of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
is important to this Treaty, Contracting Parties should promote  its effective
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In 1994, the FAO initiated an intergovernmental round of ne-
gotiations meant to revise the 1983 IUPGR in order to (1) make
it legally binding, and (2) to harmonize its provisions with the
1992 CBD, which, as mentioned earlier, was at odds with the
1983 IUPGR’s broad definition of common heritage (the CBD
stressed the notion of PGR as sovereign property).  In November
2001, 116 member nations (including the United States) signed a
new agreement, the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Re-
sources (ITPGR).182
The ITPGR reaffirms the commitment to farmers’ rights as
protecting traditional knowledge relevant to PGR, recognizing a
right to equitable benefit sharing, and recognizing the right to
participate in decision-making at national levels on matters re-
lated to conservation and use of PGR.183  However, the ITPGR
allowed the most important issue with regard to farmers’ rights—
the right to use, exchange, and sell farm-saved seeds of tradi-
tional as well as improved varieties—to remain within the sole
discretion of national governments.184  The ITPGR sought to
achieve farmers’ rights by exchanging information,185 facilitating
technology transfer and capacity building,186 and sharing the ben-
implementation, including through national actions and, as appropriate , in-
ternational cooperation to provide a coherent framework, inter alia, for
capacity-building, technology transfer and exchange of information, taking
into account the provisions of Article 13.
(emphasis added).
It is not surprising that the GPA seems to suffer the same fate as the revised
IUPGR, discussed infra in note 172, when it comes to the reluctance of FAO to fund
it.  The language in article 14 is framed in soft terms including “should promote”
when referring to effective implementation and “as appropriate” when talking about
international cooperation.  Such language has led to the impression that national
action is discretionary rather than mandatory. See  Gregory Rose, International Law
of Sustainable Agriculture in the 21st Century:  The International Treaty on Plant Ge-
netic Resources for Food and Agriculture , 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 583, 592
(2003).
182 ITPGR, supra  note 19.
183 Patel, supra  note 137, at 97.
184 ITPGR article 9.3 states that “[n]othing in this Article shall be interpreted to
limit any rights that farmers have to save, use, exchange or sell farm-saved seed/
propagating material, subject to national law  and as appropriate.” (emphasis added).
185 ITPGR, supra  note 19, art. 13.2(a).
186 ITPGR, supra  note 19, art. 13.2(b)-(c). Compare with TRIPS article 66 which
mandates developed countries to provide incentives for businesses to promote and
encourage technology transfer to poorer nations.  For a discussion on technology
transfer after the TRIPS agreement, see Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman,
The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global Pub-
lic Goods , 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 279, 287-91 (2004).
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efits (monetary and non-monetary) of the commercialization of
PGR.187
The ITPGR addresses intellectual property rights in PGR by
proposing the creation of a multilateral system (MLS).188  Under
the MLS, a recipient of germplasm189 received through the MLS
(i.e., from one of the international seed banks) “shall not claim
any intellectual property or other rights” that limit access to
PGR “in the form received from the Multilateral System.”190
This means that seed germplasm in the original form received
from a seedbank cannot be protected by intellectual property
rights; however, any individual genes, advanced lines, cells, par-
ticular DNA sequences, and compounds derived from such germ-
plasm may be protected.  The “in the form received” language
works to substantially undermine the farmers’ rights provisions
of the ITPGR.191  The ITPGR does not recognize any rights in
individual farmers/breeders who develop new plant varieties
through systemic practices; however, institutional public and pri-
vate plant breeders continue to enjoy protection.192  Further-
more, while the ITPGR is more comprehensive in its treatment
of farmers’ rights, it does little to offer effective implementation
or vindication of those rights.193
187 ITPGR, supra  note 19, art. 13.2(d).  However, for an assessment on the ad-
verse impact of the diffusion of commodified plant genetic resources on the peasant
sectors of less developed countries, see Stephen B. Brush, Genetically Modified Or-
ganisms in Peasant Farming:  Social Impact and Equity , 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 135 (2001).
188 ITPGR, supra  note 19, arts. 10, 13.
189 See  ITPGR, supra  note 19, at Annex I, List of Crops Covered Under the Mul-
tilateral System.
190 ITPGR, supra  note 19, art. 12.3(d).
191 Patel, supra  note 137, at 98.
192 See, e.g ., Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Tradi-
tional Knowledge:  The Case for Intellectual Property Protection , 7 J. INT’L ECON. L.
371, 377-78 (2004).  ITPGR article 12.3 is opposed to the extension of intellectual
property rights to traditional knowledge and on plant genetic resources used for
food or agriculture.  However, the ITPGR permitted plant breeders who utilized
genetic materials from the CGIAR gene banks to obtain proprietary rights.  Article
12.3(f) and (g) does not preclude private plant breeders or public institutions from
claiming intellectual property rights on modifications of plant genetic materials;
once protection is extended, only the patent holder can release control over it.
193 While ITPGR article 9.2 recognizes the concept of farmers’ rights with regards
to plant genetic resources for food and agriculture, it places the primary responsibil-
ity of its realization on national governments.  The ITPGR only calls for each signa-
tory nation to enact legislation to protect farmers’ rights in the areas of (1)
protection of traditional knowledge; (2) the right to equitable participation; and (3)
the right to participate in decision-making.  Although article 9.3 preserves the right
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V
THE “MALTHUS, MENDEL, AND MONSANTO” CONFERENCE
Papers from the “Malthus, Monsanto, and Mendel” conference
examine three general themes: (1) the costs that proprietary
rights in seeds impose on the global production of food, thus
shaping industrial agriculture with effects down the distribution
chain from the seed, to the crop, to transportation and manufac-
ture, to the retail level; (2) the ways that production of agricul-
tural knowledge in the twentieth century has shifted from public-
sponsored research to a largely privatized model where “public”
agricultural research is sponsored by and heavily beholden to pri-
vate industry; (3) the expanding and changing role that intellec-
tual property rights (whether patents or UPOV) play in the prior
two areas.  While all of the panelists are not represented by the
following papers, the contributors to this symposium reflect these
themes and offer valuable insights.  I will briefly introduce the
contributors.
A. Henry L. Shands, “Current Status of Access and
Availability of Plant Genetic Resources”
Dr. Henry L. Shands is the director of the USDA’s National
Plant Germplasm System seed repository at Fort Collins, Colo-
rado.194  This is a national seed library that, as Dr. Shands de-
scribes, has operated under a norm of open access to material
stored in its collection.
One important aspect of the national seed germplasm library
has been the changing backdrop of international legal treatment
of PGR.  During Dr. Shands’s tenure as director, he has seen the
apparent demise of the problematic common heritage regime195
that gave rise to the protests of activists such as Pat Mooney196 in
the 1980s and the rise of the current regime of the CBD and the
for farmers to save, use, exchange or sell farm-saved seed or propagating material,
this right is subject to local legislation.
194 See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING GLOBAL GENETIC
RESOURCES:  THE U.S. NATIONAL PLANT GERMPLASM SYSTEM (1991).
195 Steven B. Brush, The Demise of “Common Heritage” and Protection for
Traditional Agricultural Knowledge, available at  http://law.wusn.edu/centeris/
confpapers (last visited Mar. 9, 2003).
196 See generally  PAT ROY MOONEY, SEEDS OF THE EARTH:  A PUBLIC OR PRI-
VATE RESOURCE? (1979).  For a brief biography of Pat Mooney see Bio:  Pat
Mooney - About Staff - ETC Groups , available at  http://www.etcgroup.org/bio_
mooney. asp (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
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ITPGR wherein PGR are considered sovereign national
property.197
Dr. Shands’s article describes how the National Gene Bank de-
veloped from the late nineteenth century and how it has strived
to manage its valuable resources and administer them under an
open access norm—a task that has grown increasingly difficult
with the expansion of intellectual property rights in PGR over
the past twenty years.  The U.S. National Plant Germplasm Sys-
tem (NPGS) is the world’s largest collection with more than 1500
genera and over 10,000 species.  Dr. Shands notes that since the
CBD198 went into force, material received by the NPGS has de-
clined due to uncertainty about how the CBD will work with the
ITPGR199 and other questions relating both to changing national
intellectual property regimes as well as questions regarding equi-
table benefit sharing under the CBD.
Dr. Shands’s short but informative piece raises the themes of
how the spate of new treaties, such as the ITPGR and the CBD,
interact with regard to either facilitating or restricting access to
plant genetic materials.
B. Stephen S. Jones, “Progress Without Patents: Public
Maintenance of Agricultural Knowledge”
Dr. Stephen Jones is a winter wheat breeder at Washington
State University200 in eastern Washington and represents an in-
creasingly rare figure, a public plant breeder at a land grant uni-
versity201 that has not been co-opted by the infusion of massive
private investment in public agricultural research over the past
half century.
Dr. Jones has been working on breeding a variety of perennial
winter wheat,202 a holy grail of sorts for plant breeders who have
been seeking to reverse the trend represented by “Terminator”
197 See generally JACK R. KLOPPENBURG, SEEDS AND SOVEREIGNTY (1988) for a
wide range of views regarding the common heritage versus the sovereign property
approach towards plant genetic resources.
198 See Henry L. Shands, Current Status of Access and Availability of Plant Genetic
Resources, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 223 (2004).
199 The ITPGR came into force on June 30, 2004, when it gained the necessary
ratifications in 40 countries that were signatories. See  ftp://ext-ftp.fao.org/ ag/cgrfa/
it/ITPGRe.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
200 See  http://css.wsu.edu/Fac_Prof_Crops/Jones.htm (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
201 See  discussion supra  note 34.
202 For more information on Dr. Jones’s work on winter wheat, see http://
winterwheat.wsu.edu/index.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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technology—genetically engineered seeds that only produce for
one season and then are sterile.
Dr. Jones’s research occurred against a fraught international
backdrop.  The EU was then in the process of lifting a morato-
rium it placed on the import of foods containing GE se-
quences203—the EU is the number one world market for
American wheat.  Not wishing to foreclose the European market,
U.S. farmers have been hesitant to begin growing GE wheat.  To
the extent that Dr. Jones succeeds in breeding perennial winter
wheat and it becomes widely adopted, the prospects of a market
lock on GE wheat that only grows one season will be seriously
diminished.  During the summer of 2004, Monsanto announced
that it was abandoning its attempt to introduce Roundup Ready
GE wheat in the North American market.204
Dr. Jones’s article warns against the co-optation of public agri-
cultural research by global agrochemical money.  The article also
looks at the way that agricultural knowledge is produced and the
role it plays in the way that food is produced.
Dr. Jones traces the major changes that U.S. agricultural re-
search underwent in the 120 years from the passage of the Morril
Act of 1862205 (establishing the public research infrastructure of
land grant universities) to the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (which en-
couraged public universities to patent and commercialize their
inventions).  Dr. Jones notes how public agricultural research
programs began to increasingly partner with multinational
agrochemical corporations.  Finally, Dr. Jones argues that when
thinking about the future of the global food supply, one must ask
whether expansion of intellectual property rights is necessary to
avert Malthusian famine or whether intellectual property rights
in PGR are a misleading diversion that keeps us from examining
serious distributive questions about the global food supply.
203 See supra  note 18.
204 Mike Toner, Biotech Wheat Plan Halted; For Farmers and Food Firms, Move is
‘Huge Victory,’ THE ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, May 11, 2004, at 3A.  For
the Monsanto press release see Monsanto to Realign Research Portfolio, Develop-
ment of Roundup Ready Wheat Deferred Decision Follows Portfolio Review, Con-
sultation with Growers available at  http://www.monsanto.com/ monsanto/layout/
media/04/05-10-04.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
205 Morrill Act, ch. 130, 12 Stat. 504 (1862) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 304
(2000)) (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
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C. John E. Haapala, “Farmers’ Rights” and “Patent Pools
and Antitrust Concerns in Plant Biotechnology”
John E. Haapala, Jr. is an organic farmer who has worked with
the Farmer Cooperative Genome Project206 and Oregon Tilth’s
organic seed certification program.207  His two articles squarely
address the question of intellectual property rights in PGR.
1. “Farmers’ Rights”
Haapala’s first article addresses the drastic reversal in the
meaning of farmers’ rights that occurred between the early 1980s
and the present, which entailed the loss of the traditional ability
of farmers to select, save, use, and exchange seed stock grown in
their own fields.208  This sea change has occurred as intellectual
property rights, whether plant variety protection certificates or
utility patent protection in countries, such as the United States,
have been dramatically expanded in administrative, legislative,
and judicial fora.  Haapala notes how even the very term “farm-
ers’ rights” has to a large extent been co-opted and used in trea-
ties like the ITPGR.
Like Shands and Jones, Haapala references seed saving and
exchange by farmers prior to and throughout recorded history,
and notes that conservation of plant genetic diversity depends
upon widespread use and development by farmers dependent on
continuing access to these varieties.  He further notes that while
Luther Burbank argued for legal recognition of the innovative
work that plant breeders engaged in, the PPA only extended le-
gal protection to asexually propagated plants and not to sexually
reproduced seed or plants, thus reserving to farmers the right to
continue to use, save, and exchange seeds.  He also notes that
Congress, prior to 1970, had explicitly refrained from conferring
intellectual property protection to sexually reproduced plants
under the U.S. Patent Act.  Finally, he observes that when Con-
gress got around to conferring intellectual property rights on sex-
ually propagated plants, it created a sui generis  regime, the
PVPA, which allowed farmers to save, use, exchange, and even
sell sexually propagated seed.
206 For information on the Farmer Cooperative Genome Project, see http://
www.fcgp.org/FCGPpages/foundmtg.html (last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
207 For information on Oregon Tilth, see http://www.tilth.org/site/ABOUT.html
(last visited Mar. 9, 2005).
208 For a 1980s articulation of what farmers’ rights meant, see supra  note 139.
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Haapala follows with a discussion of ex parte Hibberd , a case
where the PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals held that a maize
plant with heightened levels of tryptophan was patentable under
a general utility patent.  He contends that the significance of the
case was that it represented how an administrative agency deci-
sion could run counter to over sixty-five years of congressional
policy on the scope of intellectual property rights in sexually
propagated plants.
The concentration in the global agrochemical sector that has
produced so-called “gene giants” such as Syngenta, DuPont, and
Monsanto did not escape Haapala’s notice.  Haapala notes that
the judicial expansion of utility patent rights to sexually propa-
gated plants has shored up the economic underpinnings of these
corporate giants, transforming farmers around the globe into bio-
serfs by hanging the guillotine of patent infringement liability
over their heads.209
Haapala then points out how article 15 of the 1992 CBD210
characterized PGR as a form of sovereign property211 and iter-
ated that national governments had the right to benefit via royal-
ties for plant genetic materials that were derived from bio-
material within their sovereign boundaries.  He notes that this
meant that farmers’ rights to save seed were suddenly trans-
formed into intellectual property rights for all varieties held by a
country, despite the lack of distinctness, uniformity, or stability.
As a remedy, Haapala suggests establishing an international
registry where farmers, breeders, and curators could establish
plant varieties as prior art and defeat any subsequent patent
claims for lack of novelty.  Haapala’s take on farmers’ rights
serves to highlight ways that the emerging international regime
for PGR has a remarkable blind spot—the needs and traditions
of farmers and farming communities around the world.
209 See  Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.C. 34; Monsanto v. McFarling, 363 F.3d
1336 (2004).
210 See  discussion of the CBD supra  Part IV.E.
211 The position of the CBD that plant genetic resources were sovereign property
was a drastic reversal of the position of the 1983 FAO International Undertaking on
Plant Genetic Resources’ characterization that plant genetic resources, whether un-
improved landraces farmers’ varieties or improved (and protected by intellectual
property laws) varieties of the global North, were “the common heritage of
mankind.”
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2. Patent Pools and Antitrust Concerns in Plant Biotechnology
In his second contribution to the symposium, Haapala de-
scribes the global rise of patents on genes and PGR.  He then
notes that with the rise of patented crops, agrochemical corpora-
tions holding the patents have required farmers to sign licensing
agreements with forum selection clauses and rules and provisions
preventing growers from saving, using, selling, and exchanging
seeds.
Haapala observes that there may be antitrust problems that
arise for a patent holder when they bring a patent infringement
lawsuit and the defendant raises defenses such as false procure-
ment of a patent, bad faith patent enforcement, monopoly
power, and patent misuse.212  In the area of plant biotechnology,
Haapala discusses the “anticommons”213 problem of patent
thickets (when multiple patent holders control components of a
product, driving the price higher than if a single firm controlled
the relevant technology), reach-through claims (where upstream
patent holders control technology used in the research process
itself), and blocking patents (when improvement patents and pio-
neer technology cannot be exploited without infringing on one
another).  Additionally, Haapala mentions the antitrust concerns
that may be triggered by grantback provisions (agreements to as-
sign subsequent improvements in a technology to the licensor/
grantor) and tying arrangements (conditioning the license of a
patented technology on a “tied” license on an unpatented com-
212 See  Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965); Handguards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F. 2d 986 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 35 U.S. 377 (1956); Steven C. Carlson,
Patent Pools and the Antitrust Dilemma, 16 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (1999).
213 Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research , 280 SCI. 698 (1998). See generally  Michael
Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons , 111 HARV. L. REV. 621 (1993). But cf .
Chetan Gulati, Tragedy of the Commons in Plant Genetic Resources:  The Need for a
New International Regime Centered Around an International Biotechnology Patent
Office , 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 63 (2001).  For further discussion on the
concept of the “commons,” see generally SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS
(1998); JOHN A. BADEN & DOUGLAS S. NOONAN, MANAGING THE COMMONS
(1998); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS:  THE EVOLUTION OF INSTI-
TUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).  For a comprehensive treatment of the
notion of the “public domain,” see James Boyle, Foreward:  The Opposite of Prop-
erty , 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2003); James Boyle, The Public Domain:  The
Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public Domain , 66 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 33 (2003).
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ponent/technology), which may be used to hold research projects
hostage.214
In the vein of Stephen Jones, Haapala asks what the impact of
the increasingly complex intellectual property environment is on
public agricultural research.  Haapala argues that industry con-
centration has negatively impacted agricultural research.  In the
face of this type of industry concentration, underwritten in part
by patents (and potential patent infringement liability), Haapala
asks what needs to be done.215
Haapala suggests establishing a patent pool for plant genetic
information and plant patents.  Haapala acknowledges the myr-
iad difficulties with this idea, including: judicial hostility towards
such pools, the ambivalent attitude towards such pools taken by
the U.S. Department of Justice, and the transaction costs of
bringing together diverse parties with different objectives.  Yet
another difficulty is the absence of a unitary international patent
system.  Nonetheless, Haapala sees a potentially important role
for the government in facilitating such a patent pool involving
PGR.  He suggests exploring legislative establishment of a sui
generis  system applicable to PGR or even creating compulsory
licenses.
An unanswered question is how the post-1992 CBD/ITPGR
regime of sovereign property in PGR works on the international
level with Haapala’s proposed changes in U.S. law.  If one takes
the demise of the common heritage regime seriously, the com-
plexity of implementing such changes in the intellectual property
regimes of numerous nations may prove daunting indeed.  Not-
withstanding these questions, Haapala sketches out a number of
interesting, if controversial, ideas on how our domestic legal sys-
tem might avert a tragedy of the anticommons with respect to
PGR and promote greater access and innovation with regard to
such materials.
214 See  Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., 329 U.S. 637
(1947); Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 504 U.S. 455 (1992);
Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 383 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1967); McCullough Tool
Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965).
215 The prolification of patents in biotechnology could be traced to the “patent
first, ask questions later” approach that generally prevails in the United States.  For
more on this concept, see Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later:  Mo-
rality and Biotechnology in Patent Law , 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469 (2003).
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D. Malla Pollack: “Originalism, J.E.M., and the Food
Supply, or Will the Real Decision Maker Please Stand Up?”
Professor Pollack’s article focuses on the 2001 J.E.M. v. Pio-
neer Hi-Bred  U.S. Supreme Court decision that held that sexu-
ally propagated plants are patentable subject matter if they
otherwise meet the novelty, nonobviousness, and utility require-
ment of the U.S. Patent Act.  Taking a critical stance, Professor
Pollack points out that utility patents on many biotechnological
inventions, including the patent at issue in J.E.M. v. Pioneer Hi-
Bred , are suspect because the PTO has allowed deposit to substi-
tute for the statutorily-mandated enabling written description re-
quired by the Patent Act in 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1 (section
112(1)).  This is particularly curious because, during the 1980s,
science began providing the appropriate language to accurately
provide written descriptions of biotechnological inventions.  Pro-
fessor Pollack observes that the courts and the PTO have given a
few large businesses the power to close down most independent
research on basic food crops.
Professor Pollack lays her argument out methodically, first ex-
amining the parameters of Article I, Section 8, clause 8 of the
U.S. Constitution (the Patent and Copyright clause).216  Profes-
sor Pollack then examines the Patent Acts of 1790 and 1793, and
reasons that if plants are patentable, they are either “manufac-
tures” or “compositions of matter”—enacted terms going back
respectively to the 1790 and 1793 Acts.  Next, Professor Pollack
assesses the PPA of 1930 and the PVPA of 1970, noting that
neither statute required enabling descriptions for statutory pro-
tection, but also that neither statute gave the holder the exclusive
rights a utility patent holder received.  Indeed, the PVPA in-
cluded an explicit farmer seed saving exemption as well as a re-
search exemption.
After establishing the statutory context, Professor Pollack ex-
amines the J.E.M.  court’s understanding of the terms “manufac-
ture” and “composition of matter” and finds that there was not a
single patent on a seed, plant, plant part, or animal between 1790
and 1836.  She then goes on to challenge the J.E.M.  court’s reli-
216 See  Malla Pollack, What is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Pro-
gress” in  Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introduc-
ing the Progress Clause , 80 NEB. L. REV. 754 (2001). See generally , EDWARD C.
WALTERSHEID, TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL ARTS:  AMERICAN PATENT
LAW AND ADMINISTRATION, 1787-1836 (1998).
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ance on the 1952 Patent Act’s legislative history.  Professor Pol-
lack also criticizes the J.E.M.  court’s reliance on a 1999
amendment to the Patent Act, which allowed foreign plant vari-
ety protection documents to set priority for related patents.  She
is similarly dismayed by the J.E.M.  court’s reliance on congres-
sional non-action in response to the PTO’s recognition of full
utility patents in the 1985 Board of Patent Appeals case, ex parte
Hibberd .217  Professor Pollack notes that congressional non-ac-
tion is ambiguous at best and that, in the context of utility plant
protection for sexually reproduced plants, it may be of no proba-
tive value, contrary to what the court suggests.
Beyond criticizing the J.E.M.  case, Professor Pollack suggests
that it was the PTO, and not Congress, that gutted section
112(1)’s stringent description requirement for biological material
by approving use of specimen deposits as a replacement for sec-
tion 112(1)’s required written description.
Pollack looks to Canadian patent jurisprudence for an alterna-
tive path that the United States Supreme Court could have fol-
lowed.  In the 2002 Harvard College v. Canada case, the
Canadian Supreme Court declined to read “manufacture” and
“composition of matter” broadly enough to allow a higher life
form, such as an oncomouse, to be patented.218  Professor Pollack
suggests that the common sense represented by the Harvard Col-
lege  decision is preferable to the legal formalism run amok repre-
sented by the J.E.M.  decision.
Professor Pollack makes a series of arguments, centered on the
section 112(1) requirement of an enabling written description—a
sufficiently clear, written description of the putative invention
that would enable a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art to
practice the invention.  Indeed, the enabling written description
is crucial to effectuating the purposes of the U.S. Patent Act,
namely, that the public obtain practical use of the invention after
the patent term expires.  Professor Pollack notes that Congress
has indeed relaxed this requirement for plant variety certificates,
allowing that, in addition to a written description, PVPA appli-
cants have to deposit “a viable sample of basic seed” in a public
217 See  discussion of ex parte Hibberd infra  Part IV.A.2.a.
218 Harvard College v. Canada, 2002 S.C.C. 76 (“The fact that inventions are un-
anticipated and unforeseeable does not mean that they are all patentable . . . .  The
objects of the [Canadian Patent] Act are the advancement of research and develop-
ment and the encouragement of broad economic activity.  This does not imply that
to promote ingenuity is to render all inventions patentable.”)
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repository.219  However, Professor Pollack points out that Con-
gress has made no exceptions to the enabling written description
requirement for utility patents, but the PTO has.220
Finally, Professor Pollack points out that the public availability
difference between a written description and a deposit has now
become even more important because of technological advances.
Anyone with a computer can obtain full text patents, but depos-
its are not always available to the anonymous public before the
patent has expired.
After usefully reviewing the patent files for possible patents
vulnerable to a section  112(1) “lack of an enabling written dis-
closure” claim, Professor Pollack suggests that section 112(1)
may provide fertile legal ground for opponents of utility patents
on plants to create arguments that may force the hand of legisla-
tures, courts, and even international entities.
CONCLUSION
The symposium brought together interested parties with the
subject matter of panels organized into three groupings: (1) The
Global Food Supply: Concentration, Erosion, Traditional Knowl-
edge and Crisis; (2) The Production of Agricultural Knowledge
and Access to Seed Germplasm, and (3) Intellectual Property
and Beyond.  Each of these three themes were addressed in
depth by the panelists; the papers in this issue of the Journal of
Environmental Law and Litigation  address these themes in the
ways discussed above.
This Introduction has laid out the emerging global backdrop of
overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, treatment of PGR on
both the national and international level.  Dr. Shands addresses
the stresses that shifting international agreements exert on the
open access policies of the U.S. National Plant Germplasm Sys-
tem.  Dr. Jones voices concern on the production of agricultural
knowledge in public land grant universities as these institutions
increasingly turn to private funding.  Specifically, he addresses
219 35 U.S.C. § 2422(4).
220 See In re  Argoudellis, 434 F.2d 1390 (1970), 168 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 99 (in a non-
plant context, the CCPA reversed a PTO rejection of a claim for an antibiotic com-
pound and a microbiological process for preparing the compound.  The rejection
involved the then-applicable PTO requirement of a deposit of the microorganism in
a public repository.  The applicant was late in making the deposit, but contended
that the microorganism was available in a university.  The PTO rejected the applica-
tion as untimely and the CCPA reversed.)
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how multinational agrochemical corporations have become ex-
tremely interested in the research agendas of individual research-
ers and plant breeding programs.  Mr. Haapala’s first article
addresses the changes in the idea of farmers’ rights over the past
two decades and decries the strategy of the ITPGR’s approach to
create an annex of around sixty crops in international seed banks
to which a modified common heritage treatment would apply—
with all other plant genetic materials treated as sovereign na-
tional property.  Mr. Haapala’s other article paints a fairly dark
picture of expansive patent rights held by an increasingly concen-
trated fistful of multinational agrochemical/lifescience corpora-
tions; but also gingerly explores the possibility of a chastened
type of “patent pool.”  This patent pool may begin to create
grounds for a chastened sort of open access to both plant genetic
materials and other information that might serve the underlying
purposes of patent law more effectively than the current situa-
tion.  Finally, Professor Pollack presents both a trenchant critique
of the Supreme Court’s 2001 J.E.M. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred  decision
and a spirited and historically detailed argument about why util-
ity patents on plants that were at issue in J.E.M.  may be vulnera-
ble to a § 112 written enablement attack.
Taken together, these articles suggest that the expanding scope
of intellectual property laws and international treaties over the
past twenty years have been wreaking fundamental changes in
the way we think about agriculture.  While it is important not to
overstate the argument, at times it seems that the expansion of
intellectual property has taken on a life of its own.  The confer-
ence asked this still unanswered question about intellectual prop-
erty law and global food policy: Are we in control of our
institutions or are they in control of us?
